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ABSTRACT: This Article shows how the application of a takings
paradigm to pretrial detention can mitigate the distorted incentives
which shape bail hearings and plea bargaining. The case for
compensating pretrial detainees poses challenges because the
existence of probable cause of having committed a criminal offense
combined with the presence of other risk factors formally legitimizes
bail hearing decisions. However, this Article analogizes the ìtaking
of peopleî to the ìtaking of propertyî to argue that pretrial detention
constitutes a liberty taking which inflicts punishment on unconvicted
defendants and creates incentives for false pleas and other
perversions of justice. While society faces potential risks and costs
from pretrial release, this Article will argue that compensating
detainees who are never convicted or whose ultimate conviction
could not reasonably have justified the initial detention decision will
help to level the playing field for defendants in bail hearings and plea
bargaining. This Article will conclude by showing how liberty
takings can be designed to produce significant incentives for state
actors to screen cases more thoroughly and to rely more extensively
on less restrictive alternatives than pretrial detention.

* Fellow, Harvard Law School; J.D., Yale; D. Phil., Oxford University. This article is
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Bush administrationís detention of hundreds of alleged
ìenemy combatantsî and illegal aliens with suspected terrorist links
without trials, convictions, or compensation has exposed detention
powers to unprecedented scrutiny.1 Paradoxically, debate on the ìwar
on terrorî has obscured equally significant concerns surrounding the
detention of tens of thousands of American citizens each year.2 Federal
and state prosecutors routinely use their charging powers and influence
in bail hearings to put bail out of the reach of poor defendants.3 Placing
defendants in pretrial detention creates tremendous pressure for guilty
pleas regardless of actual culpability, and thus often allows prosecutors
to accomplish ìrough justiceî without the constitutional protections of
trials.4 This use of pretrial detention to encourage and expedite plea
bargaining may conserve prosecutorial resources,5 but at the
unconscionable price of perverting justice.6
1 Both judges and academics have focused on delineating the contours of executive and
judicial power in extraordinary contexts of terrorist threats or other national security emergencies.
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (holding that due process requires
that a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant must be given a meaningful opportunity to contest
his confinement); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2722-23 (2004) (holding that an alleged
enemy combatant could only bring a habeas petition in the district where confined against the
military commander of the detention facility); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696-97 (2004)
(recognizing that the federal habeas statute conferred authority on the district court to hear
Guantanamo Bay detaineesí challenges to their detention); see also Derek Jinks, The Declining
Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT íL L.J. 367, 374-75 (2004) (arguing that both the
Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law guarantee enemy combatants the same
rights as prisoners of war); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002) (questioning whether the
President has the authority to detain and try enemy combatants and alleged terrorists by military
tribunals).
2 Although precise statistics are unavailable, it is estimated that pretrial detainees make up
almost half of the inmate population of state and federal prison systems. See Marc Miller &
Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 346 n.71
(1990).
3 See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 867-69 (1995).
4 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2491-93 (2004) (discussing how pretrial detention creates significant incentives for plea
bargains and diminishes the significance of the right to trial and the protections trials provide);
Gerald E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2146 (1998) (noting that ì[p]leading guilty at the first opportunity in exchange for a sentence of
ëtime servedí is often an offer that cannot be refused. Accordingly, fully adjudicated cases may
be too rare to serve as a meaningful check on the executive authorities.î); MALCOLM M. FEELEY,
THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 236 (1992)
(finding that approximately four times as many defendants are detained prior to trial than are
imprisoned after convictions).
5 This argument parallels the efficiency-enhancing effects of the plea bargaining process that
its advocates have raised. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 290-91 (1983) (arguing that plea bargaining serves as a tool to maximize the
deterrent effect of scarce prosecutorial resources). This Article makes no claims concerning what
ìefficientî enforcement levels would or should be, but merely notes that the rationale of
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While these uncompensated detentions are legal, they present a
classic case in which a vulnerable minority is forced to bear a
significant burden for the benefit of society.7 This context is a familiar
one to the world of real property and takings law.8 This Article
conceptualizes pretrial detentions as ìliberty takingsî by analogizing the
taking of property to the ìtakingî of people by the state.9 It will show
efficiency implicitly underpins the current use of pretrial detention to incentivize and expedite
plea bargaining.
6 Many critiques have been levied against the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, which
establishes the ground rules for the federal use of pretrial detention. Debates on the injustices of
pretrial detention have filled many law journal pages, but have had little resonance in public
policy debates and resulted in still less legislative action. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler,
Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process,
85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 510-12 (1986) (arguing that the Bail Reform Act is unconstitutional
because it allows detentions in the absence of strong preliminary proof of guilt); Kenneth
Frederick Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMORY L.J. 685 (1985) (calling for the cautious
application of the Bail Reform Act to avoid its indiscriminate application); Miller &
Guggenheim, supra note 2, at 425-26 (arguing that the Bail Reform Act has dramatically
increased the number of detentions based on inaccurate, unprovable predictions of dangerousness
and threatens fundamental liberties). Articles have criticized courtsí deference to other state
actors concerning pretrial detention decisions, see, e.g., Michael Harwin, Detaining for Danger
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: Paradoxes of Procedure and Proof, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1091,
1095 (1993) (criticizing the extent to which the Bail Reform Act relies on judicial deference to
prosecutors); Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial
Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 326-29 (1994) (critiquing the Bail Reform Actís approach to
pretrial detention for failing to capture the complex gradations of factors and calculations that
should go into bail determinations), the unfairness of preventive detention in general, see, e.g.,
Krista Ward & Todd R. Wright, Pretrial Detention Based Solely on Community Danger: A
Practical Dilemma, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, 3-5 (1999) (calling for greater uniformity in
judicial determinations of whether danger to the community forms a sufficient basis in itself to
justify pretrial detention), and the unfairness of pretrial detention in particular applications, such
as against alleged immigration law offenders, see, e.g., Stephen Legomsky, The Detention of
Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AMER. L. REV. 531, 533 (1999);
Donald Kerwin & Charles Wheeler, The Detention Mandates of the 1996 Immigration Act: An
Exercise in Overkill, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1433 (1998).
7 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (ìImposing those consequences [of pretrial
detention] on anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious. It is especially unfortunate to
impose them on those persons who are ultimately found to be innocent.î).
8 ìOne of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is ëto bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.íî Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). Numerous articles have grappled with the question of
precisely what burdens the Takings Clause transfers from the shoulders of private parties onto the
public as a whole. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985) (making the expansive claim that all taxes, regulations,
and changes in liability rules should constitute takings); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND P OLITICS 289-324 (1995) (arguing that regulatory takings
should be limited only to cases of political process failure at the expense of a minority); Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ìJust
Compensationî Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-19 (1967) (arguing that government should
only compensate for takings when the demoralization costs to the affected party are not
outweighed by the transaction costs for compensation).
9 This Articleís conception of liberty takings for pretrial detainees is related to the longstanding debate on the use of liability, property, and inalienability rules to protect private interests
and rights that was initiated by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in their seminal article,
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how the reasoning from existing takings case law establishes principled
distinctions that can be used to underpin a statutory cause of action to
compensate pretrial detainees for this ìoccupationî by the state. This
approach is designed to help to level the playing field for defendants in
bail hearings and plea bargaining by tempering the incentives for the
state to use pretrial detention.10

Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972). Liability rules allow a party to pay for taking or encroaching on anotherís private
interest or right without the ownerís consent; property rules protect an interest or right from
encroachment and only allow the owner to part with the interest or right; and inalienability rules
impose a prohibition on any partyís transferring an interest or right. Id. at 1089-93. Many works
have argued the merits of expanding the use of liability rules. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Jody
Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1338-40 (1986) (asserting the
incompatibility of constitutional rights with liability rules); Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules
for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755, 790-91 (2004)
(proposing a pliability rule to allow judges to provide monetary compensation rather than
injunctive relief for rights violations under extraordinary circumstances, such as mass detentions
during national security emergencies); Meares, supra note 3, at 853-55 (arguing that offering
financial rewards to prosecutors for ethical conduct rather than relying on liability rules or other
means would provide the best incentives to reduce prosecutorial misconduct); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 719-23 (1996) (arguing that a prima facie case exists that liability rules should apply to
resolve cases of harmful externalities, while a stronger case exists that property rules should
govern possessory rights); Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53
AM. U. L. REV. 191, 192-93 (2003) (calling for reparations to the descendents of slaves based on
framing slavery as a form of takings). Kontorovichís and Wengerís contributions in applying
liability rules to the cases of mass detentions in national security crises and slavery respectively
are closest to this Articleís. But this Article breaks new ground in showing how the application
of a takings paradigm to pretrial detention can remedy the distorted incentives which shape bail
hearings and plea bargaining. The case for compensating pretrial detainees poses challenges
because the existence of probable cause combined with the presence of other risk factors formally
legitimizes bail hearing decisions. However, this Article analogizes the ìtaking of peopleî to the
ìtaking of propertyî to argue that pretrial detention constitutes a liberty taking which inflicts
punishment on unconvicted defendants and creates incentives for false pleas and other
perversions of justice. While society faces potential risks and costs from pretrial release, this
Article will argue that compensating detainees who are never convicted or whose conviction
could not reasonably have justified the initial detention decision will help to level the playing
field for defendants in bail hearings and plea bargaining. Although this proposal may lead to
some perverse incentives and effects, this Article will show how liberty takings can be designed
to produce significant incentives for state actors to screen cases more thoroughly and to rely more
extensively on less restrictive alternatives than pretrial detention.
10 This Article will show how the reasoning from case law concerning either physical or
regulatory takings can be used to delineate the scope of ìliberty takings.î The physical takings
jurisprudence is a largely settled area of law. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 562 (2001) (describing physical takings of land as the well-defined
core of takings doctrine). In contrast, the outer limits of regulatory takings are much more
uncertain and hotly contested. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings
Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566-67 (1984) (noting that regulatory takings
doctrine suffers from ambiguity concerning what percentage diminution of value from a
regulation may qualify as regulatory takings); James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1150 (1997) (discussing the significant uncertainty concerning the
contours of regulatory takings). While the contours of regulatory takings suffer from uncertainty,
the core body of what constitutes regulatory takings is more clear as Part II.A.2 will discuss in
detail.
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Each year tens of thousands of criminal defendants face periods of
pretrial detention that can last weeks to months.11 Judges detain a small
minority without bail because they are deemed a flight risk or a danger
to the community, and no other means may adequately ensure their
presence at trial.12 But the vast majority of detainees languish in
detention primarily because they are guilty of being too poor to meet
bail.13
An almost sinister logic appears to drive the extensive reliance of
the criminal justice system on pretrial detention. Prosecutors have
strong incentives to engage in ìstrategic chargingî or ìoverchargingî by
raising almost all conceivable charges against defendants.14 Even if
prosecutors are unlikely to prevail on most charges, they lose little by
raising charges and can gain leverage on defendants by invoking the
specter of onerous sentences.15 Piling on charges allows prosecutors to
tilt the scales in bail hearings heavily towards the imposition of high
bail or the outright denial of bail. By cutting defendants off from
family, friends, and jobs and subjecting them to the indignities of
detention, prosecutors place defendants in a position where they face
11 Thirty-eight percent of state felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties were
denied bail or could not meet bail in 2000. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2000 16 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fdluc00.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004) [hereinafter
FELONY DEFENDANTS]. In 2001, in the federal system, sixty percent of defendants were detained
prior to trial (out of a total of over 75,000 defendants processed). See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2001 37 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0103.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). The periods of
detention for federal detainees averaged approximately one month for individuals who were
eventually able to meet bail, to eighty-one days for those never able to meet bail, and onehundred-and-ten days for those denied bail. See id. at 40. The figures for pretrial detention by
states for misdemeanor crimes are more difficult to confirm because national statistics are not
routinely compiled. See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2491-92, 2492 n.113. However, even if more
modest percentages of misdemeanor defendants are subjected to pretrial detention, this number
would still be quite large as eighty to almost ninety percent of cases in state courts entail
misdemeanor offenses that are punishable by up to one yearís imprisonment. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002 54-55 (Brian J.
Ostrom et al. eds., 2003).
12 For example, only seven percent of state felony defendants were denied bail outright in
2000. See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 16.
13 Almost five times more pretrial detainees facing state felony charges lacked the means to
meet bail than were denied bail outright. Thirty-two percent of state felony defendants lacked the
financial means to meet bail in 2000. See id. Indigents in particular may be perceived as posing
significant flight risks because of their poverty and may have limited access to the funds of bail
bondsmen because they and their extended families may lack jobs and financial resources. While
the prosecution has the burden of establishing probable cause to hold these detainees, the
detention of indigents prior to trial often turns on their lack of means rather than their guilt.
14 See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 405-06 (1992);
Meares, supra note 3, at 867-69.
15 Significantly, prosecutors are virtually immune from civil liability for their charging
decisions. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 483 (1991). In fact, charging decisions are rarely if
ever subjected to judicial scrutiny. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (holding that
there is no federal constitutional right to any review of prosecutorial charging decisions).
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great incentives to plea bargain to end or minimize the detention.16 As a
result, pretrial detention has become a tool of prosecutorial efficiency to
heighten pressure for plea bargaining and to serve as a means of
informal punishment.17
The federal government and many states have tacitly recognized
the costs inflicted on pretrial detainees by creating a system of
ìcompensationî of limited scope and coverage. The most common
form of compensation is a set-off of time served in detention against
criminal sentences.18 Detainees may have legal recourse for financial
compensation in extreme cases in which government officials engaged
in misconduct or lacked probable cause to detain.19 However, a
detainee who is never subsequently convicted of any crime generally
has no recourse for compensation in the absence of egregious
government conduct.20 As significantly, even a system of set-offs for
16 This Article is not the first to note the distorted incentives that prosecutors face in charging
defendants and the many disadvantages that defendants face in pretrial detention. See, e.g.,
Bibas, supra note 4, at 2491-93; Lynch, supra note 4, at 2123; Miller & Guggenheim, supra note
2, at 339-43.
17 While an increased reliance on pretrial detention may fill detention centers and prisons,
these costs do not impact prosecutorsí budgets and therefore only indirectly affect prosecutors.
Weighing the scales of bail hearings towards pretrial detention enables prosecutors to handle a
greater percentage of their case-loads through plea bargains and to focus prosecutorial resources
on the most difficult cases or those in which prosecutors face well-financed defendants who seek
a jury trial. The state as a whole gains in saving money by substituting the rough justice of plea
bargaining for costly, time-consuming trials. See Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon,
Understanding Prison Policy and Population Trends, 26 CRIME & JUST. 63, 99 n.29 (1999)
(noting that the rate of increase in corrections spending rose at a seventy percent higher rate than
court spending from 1982 to 1993, which suggests that courts have been increasingly able to rely
on plea bargaining to substitute for trials).
18 The underlying logic of offsetting time served in detention against a criminal sentence is
that the conviction provides a full post-hoc justification for the detention. Therefore, the time
served in detention is viewed constructively as partial or full fulfillment of the sentence. Even
this ìcompensationî is limited, as detainees receive no additional compensation if time served in
detention exceeds the criminal sentence. See 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b) (2000) (establishing that a
convicted party must generally ìbe given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for
any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commencesî). But see
Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (holding that the release of a convicted party into a
community treatment center pending sentencing is not tantamount to government detention and
therefore does not merit set-off credit for sentencing under 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b)).
19 A variety of causes of action are available to pretrial detainees including ß 1983 actions
and common law torts for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
However, these causes of action may help only a slender percentage of detainees, because
claimants must show that the government lacked probable cause in their arrest and detention or
engaged in even more egregious misconduct. See Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails:
Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 86-93 (1999).
20 Technically speaking, individuals may only be found ìnot guilty,î as an assistant U.S.
attorney in New Haven emphasized to me. This fact may merely reflect the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion not to pursue a case further, but even this is unclear as prosecutorsí
offices routinely use language of cases ìdropping outî that appears intentionally to obfuscate the
reason. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 50, 50 n.68 (2002). But in the United States presumptive innocence until proven guilty
is not only a rule of evidence but also a cardinal principle of our system. Individuals who are
found not guilty are therefore presumptively innocent and should be treated as such. See Steve
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time-served against convictions does not reflect how disadvantages
caused by pretrial detention may have compromised the detaineeís
ability to defend herself.21
The liberty takings proposal is designed to fill the gaps in this
system of compensation for pretrial detainees. This Article argues that
any pretrial detention (above a de minimis threshold of forty-eight hours
for a bail hearing22) constitutes a taking of oneís liberty by the state. A
narrow view of liberty takings would posit that a conviction for any
crime underpinning the detention justifies the detention and hold that
the offset of time served therefore constitutes full compensation. If a
detainee were not convicted of any of the underlying charges, then
liberty takings would require compensation based on the individualís
opportunity cost for the time detained.23 Fairness considerations would
suggest the desirability of employing a per diem floor and ceiling on
compensation to ensure that the most vulnerable defendants receive a
fair settlement and that high wage-earners are not automatically
excluded from detention because of their high opportunity cost.24 The
advantage of this narrow view of liberty takings is its simplicity of
administration as liability rules would be clear-cut, and the primary
issue in dispute would be the proper measure for compensation.
The broad conception of liberty takings would seek to account for
the fact that a conviction or plea on a minor charge may not vindicate
the initial detention decision. The broad view would allow individuals
to seek financial compensation if their ultimate conviction or guilty plea
could not reasonably have justified the detention. By placing a
rebuttable presumption against such compensation, claimants would
face the burden of establishing that a reasonable judge would not have
allowed the detention in the first place had prosecutors only raised the
Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have
Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165, 1166-68 (2003).
21 As this Article will discuss in detail, a paradigmatic case concerning this point involved the
guilty plea of nuclear scientist and alleged spy Wen Ho Lee to a minor offense that ended an over
one-year detention and resolved a fifty-nine count indictment. Prosecutors could not have
detained him for more than one day if they had only raised the single charge. But prosecutors
implicitly used Leeís guilty plea to save face concerning the decision to detain Lee in the first
place as the single conviction was used to offset the time in detention. See Matthew Purdy &
James Sterngold, Under Suspicion: The Prosecution Unravels: The Case of Wen Ho Lee, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001, at A1.
22 See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
23 Foregone earnings or earnings power would serve as the primary proxy for opportunity
cost, which is the closest analogue to the use of a landís fair market value (i.e., the present value
of future stream of rents) to compensate for property takings. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter
Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 75, 83-84 (2004).
24 As Part II.B.2 will discuss, innocent detainees who are eligible for ß 1983 actions or torts
for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution would be able to collect only
the greater of compensation for one of these actions or for liberty takings. Since such detainees
would already have adequate redress for the deprivations they suffered, this provision would seek
to prevent them from gaining a windfall through liberty takings claims.
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charge(s) for which the detainee was convicted. Embracing a broad
view of liberty takings could consume more judicial resources than
limiting compensation solely to innocent detainees. But this approach
would also help to prevent prosecutors from transforming liberty
takings into a farce by making token guilty pleas a virtual condition of
release to inoculate the state from liability.
This legislative proposal would borrow the reasoning from existing
physical and regulatory takings doctrine to draw a sharp line between
pretrial detention and lesser restraints on liberty, such as home detention
or electronic monitoring. This distinction would seek to provide
incentives for prosecutors to invest in greater screening of cases and to
exercise charging powers with greater restraint and for judges to employ
less restrictive alternatives that secure defendantsí presence at trial.
The challenge facing this proposal is the practical stumbling blocks
to implementation. This Article will show how costs can be contained
to politically acceptable levels. While the full incentive effects on the
state and individual state actors are admittedly difficult to gauge,25 this
Article will show how liberty takings can be designed to produce
incentives for greater prosecutorial screening and a reduction in the
stateís reliance on pretrial detention.26
Part I of this Article will lay out the significance and scope of the
federal governmentís pretrial detention powers, the mechanics of the
bail setting process, and the incentives that prosecutors and judges face
in setting bail. This Part will highlight the real and substantial costs that
pretrial detention inflicts on detainees. It will make the case for why
compensating detainees may both offer the best means to remedy the
injustices inflicted by pretrial detention and significant incentives for
the state to secure defendantsí presence at trial through less restrictive
means.
Part II will develop the analogy between the taking of land and the
taking of liberty that forms the basis for liberty takings. It will show
how the reasoning from either physical or regulatory takings may
underpin the construction of a framework to delineate liberty takings.
This Part will lay out conditions for compensation designed to ensure
adequacy of scope and coverage, show how the costs can be contained
to manageable levels, and assess the incentive effects of liberty takings.
Finally, this Article will conclude by exploring potential strategies for
25 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 414 (2000).
26 Bail hearings entail a complex interplay of federal or state guidelines for bail setting,
judgesí discretion in implementing those guidelines, and prosecutorsí roles in charging
defendants and proposing bail. For this reason, it is admittedly difficult to gauge the full
deterrence effect of liberty takings in causing prosecutors and judges to exercise restraint.
However, this Article will suggest how compensation for liberty takings could be tailored to
heighten the incentives for judges and prosecutors to rely less on pretrial detention. See infra Part
II.C.4.
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overcoming the significant political obstacles to the enactment of liberty
takings and for seeking to maximize the deterrent effect on judges and
prosecutors.

II.

THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING PRETRIAL DETENTION WITHOUT
COMPENSATION

A.

The Scope and Significance of Pretrial Detention Powers
1.

The Significance of Pretrial Detention

The use of detentions in the war on terror has thrust the
governmentís detention powers to the forefront of public debate.
Academics have fixated their attention on critiquing the prolonged
detentions of hundreds of enemy combatants and illegal aliens with
suspected terrorist ties and the potential Pandoraís Box these precedents
may open.27 This debate has served a valuable purpose in heightening
popular awareness of the federal governmentís broad detention powers
and serving as a clarion call of the need to maintain the U.S.
commitment to civil liberties. But this criticism has focused primarily
on the most extreme and exceptional threats to civil liberties posed by
detentions related to national security concerns and largely overlooked
the routine uses of detentions prior to convictions by all levels of
government.28
One might not realize it from reading newspapers or law reviews,
but enemy combatants and illegal aliens are not the only individuals
currently facing prolonged detentions without trials, convictions, or
compensation. In fact, the tens of thousands of American citizens
subject to pretrial detention each year dwarf the number of detentions
related to national security concerns and may result in countless cases of
unjust punishment or wrongful convictions.29 These detentions take

27
28

See, e.g., Jinks, supra note 1, at 374-75; Katyal & Tribe, supra note 1, at 1260.
See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and
Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1955 (2004) (discussing how the emergency
powers claimed by the federal government in the war on terror exceed those claimed by the
government in the past and those exercised by other Western countries).
29 See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 16, 37 (documenting the tens of thousands of
pretrial detainees held by the federal and state governments). It is admittedly difficult to estimate
the extent of unjust punishment or wrongful convictions. The perverse incentives created by
pretrial detention obscure the number of people who cop a false plea to get out of detention or
face a longer sentence because they were able to mount a less effective defense from behind
prison walls. In contrast, individuals who have copped a false plea have little incentive and even
less ability to try to clear their names after the fact.
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place largely under the radar screen of public scrutiny,30 yet it is
surprising that the popular outrage surrounding the detention of enemy
combatants has not extended to wider criticism of pretrial detention.
Part of the answer lies in the fact that a greater veneer of legal
safeguards attempts to legitimize pretrial detentions of criminal
defendants.31 But while the dearth of procedural checks on the
detention of enemy combatants constitutes a glaring wrong,32 both
forms of detention may inflict significant injustices on innocent people.
Another part of the explanation may be that the sheer scale and routine
use of pretrial detentions have desensitized the public to the practice,
which contrasts with the novelty of national security detentions.
Nonetheless, there is no little irony in the fact that commentators
have loudly decried the plight of enemy combatants from distant lands
or focused on hypotheticals at home,33 while tens of thousands of
American citizens continue to languish in detention for prolonged
periods in spite of having been convicted of little more than being
poor.34 This fact brings up a more sinister explanation. The
administration of criminal justice often appears based on the implicit
assumption that a large percentage of defendants who are not convicted
of anything or anything serious are actually guilty of serious crimes.35
30 The Bail Reform Act of 1984 set the ground rules for a dramatic expansion of pretrial
detention in federal courts and aroused significant controversy at the time of its enactment. See,
e.g., Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 2, at 425-26; Williams, supra note 6, at 326-29. But these
criticisms fell on deaf ears, and time has likely led to even deeper public acquiescence to the
widespread use of pretrial detention.
31 See infra Part I.A.3.
32 The need to establish probable cause for the arrest and the prospect of an eventual trial,
however distant in practice, establishes some limits on the scope of those affected and the length
of pretrial detention. In contrast, the Bush administration advanced sweeping claims of
discretionary power to justify enemy combatant detentions. See Schulhofer, supra note 28, at
1910-15.
33 In Bleak House, Charles Dickens paints a picture of the public-minded elite of Victorian
England being fixated on the welfare of those in distant colonies, while being oblivious to the
suffering of those at their doorstep. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 85 (Norman Page ed.,
1971) (1853). While Guantanamo Bay is far closer to the United States than Dickensí mythical
Borrioboola-Gha in Africa was to England, much of the same logic may apply as it may be easier
to get excited about a distant problem rather than about a means of informal punishment that
routinely takes place in oneís own city.
34 Only a handful of alleged enemy combatants have been U.S. citizens, such as Yaser Esam
Hamdi and Jose Padilla. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635-36 (2004);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004). In contrast, the overwhelming majority of
those subjected to national security detentions have been non-citizens. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush,
124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004) (noting that since early 2002 approximately 640 non-Americans
have been detained at Guantanamo Bay). In contrast, the vast majority of the tens of thousands of
pretrial detainees each year are U.S. citizens. One should not denigrate the significance of the
issues raised in both citizen and non-citizen contexts, but the fact that U.S. citizens bear the
burdens inflicted by pretrial detention makes this issue one that should strike close to home.
35 See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1326, 1329-30 (1997) (noting the widespread
belief that individuals who are charged with crimes are guilty, regardless of whether or not they
are ultimately convicted).
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This assumption is better suited to an authoritarian regime oriented
towards sustaining social control than to a system whose cornerstone is
the presumption of innocence. But it is also a proposition of dubious
validity as the literature on wrongful convictions attests.36 Nonetheless,
this conventional wisdom of the culpability of anyone that the
government has probable cause to arrest goes far towards explaining
popular apathy to pretrial detentions and the dearth of remedies for
detainees who are not convicted.
A corollary to this point is that the public may turn a blind eye to
pretrial detention because this burden falls disproportionately on the
poor and racial minorities, takes potential threats from the streets, and
subjects them to informal punishment.37 The popular response might be
quite a different story if a backlog of drug enforcement cases drew in
large numbers of white middle class youth into prolonged pretrial
detentions, but here the poverty and/or race of most victims has created
little sympathy.38 While there is little direct evidence that racial
minorities face more onerous bail conditions than similarly situated
white defendants, a disproportionate number of racial minorities face
prosecution in the criminal justice system and generally have less
resources to meet bail.39 This fact means that racial minorities,
36 See generally NATíL INST. OF JUSTICE , U.S. DEP íT OF JUSTICE, EDWARD CONNORS ET
AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996) (suggesting that the rate of wrongful
convictions is far greater than recognized); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 263

(2000) (discussing how a range of factors including mistaken identification, police misconduct,
and false confessions account for wrongful convictions in many cases).
37 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the U.S. public has acquiesced, if not
embraced, a dramatic increase of approximately 110 inmates per 100,000 people in 1970 to
approximately 700 inmates per 100,000 in 2002. This figure dwarfs the incarceration rates in
other developed nations. See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 323, 328-29 (2004).
38 See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1283, 1288-89 (1995) (discussing how the penalties for trafficking in crack cocaine are
dramatically harsher than for more commonly used powder cocaine and attributing this difference
to the fact that crack cocaine dealing and use are overwhelmingly concentrated in poor, AfricanAmerican urban areas).
39 Direct attempts to assess whether or how much race shapes bail setting decisions have been
difficult. As Part I.A.3 will discuss, prosecutorial discretion in charging plays a salient role in the
bail hearing process, and one of the main dangers of prosecutorial discretion is the systematic
targeting of minority groups. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE : A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 22 (1969); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1539-43 (1981). Some regression analyses have suggested race is the
determining factor in higher bail levels for racial minorities compared to whites, while seeking to
control for permissible bail setting factors. See 2 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL
COMMISSION ON MINORITIES 141-54 (1991) (laying out evidence that racial minorities are
subjected to racial discrimination in bail setting); FEELEY, supra note 4, at 207, 231, 312 n.10
(finding a statistically significant variance in the bail treatment of African-Americans compared
to whites even though African-Americans were less likely to flee, yet concluding that there was
no evidence of racial discrimination). But these studies suffer from omitted variable bias, as race
may be correlated with unobserved variables that legitimately increase the bail for racial
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especially African-Americans, bear the burdens of pretrial detention in
significantly greater numbers, just as they disproportionately face
imprisonment.40
2.

The Broad Scope of the Stateís Detention Powers

Courts have long recognized that both the federal government and
states have broad powers to detain individuals before trial.41 While
courts have recently imposed limits on the federal governmentís
detentions of enemy combatants,42 the government retains broad
discretion to detain individuals in a wide range of contexts.43 Suspects
may be detained prior to a magistrateís determination of probable
cause.44 Thereafter, defendants may be detained without bail if judges

minorities. See Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum
Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1299, 1305-12 (1984). However, Ian Ayres and Joel Waldfogel have produced convincing
indirect evidence that racial minorities are subjected to higher bail than white defendants. See Ian
Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 987, 1038-40 (1994) (arguing that the fact that bail bondsmen charge significantly lower
bond rates to African-American and Hispanic defendants than white defendants provides market
evidence that judges impose higher levels of bail that is necessary to reasonably assure the
appearance of minority defendants at trial).
40 Racial minorities, especially African-Americans, are both disproportionately prosecuted
and represented in American prisons relative to their percentage of the population. See MICHAEL
TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 28-31 (1995); MARC
MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 126 (1999) (noting that AfricanAmericans are over seven times more likely than whites to face incarceration). While this result
may be a product of African-Americansí committing proportionately more crimes than other
groups, a number of empirical studies have found that a defendantís race at least in some
instances does affect charging decisions and other stages of the criminal justice process. See
Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of OverEnforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1006-07 (2001); Randolph N. Stone, The Criminal
Justice System: Unfair and Ineffective, in CRIME, COMMUNITIES AND PUBLIC POLICY 127
(Lawrence B. Joseph ed., 1995).
41 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741, 747 (1979); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 257 (1984) (justifying the pretrial detention of a juvenile defendant who posed a risk to the
community as a regulatory measure rather than punitive act and holding that this detention did not
violate the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
42 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.
Ct. 2711, 2722-23 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696-97 (2004).
43 For example, the federal government may detain resident aliens prior to deportation
proceedings. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-42 (1952) (recognizing that the
Executive Branch has sweeping powers to detain illegal aliens prior to deportation proceedings).
But see Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716, 727 (2005) (holding that if there is not a substantial
likelihood of removal of an alien deportee to any country willing to accept the deportee, then she
must be released within six months); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that the
Immigration and Naturalization Act imposes an implicit reasonableness limitation on the length
of detention of illegal aliens before final removal and positing that the presumptive limit to a
reasonable removal period is six months).
44 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 (1975).
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hold they pose a significant danger to the public,45 or constitute a
serious flight risk before trial.46
The vast majority of defendants who are detained before trial are
not denied bail outright, but rather are simply too poor to meet bail.47
The irony is that federal law explicitly states that ì[t]he judicial officer
[in a bail hearing] may not impose a financial condition that results in
the pretrial detention of the person.î48 Most state constitutions
expressly guarantee the availability of pretrial release during trial,49 and
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution expressly prohibits
excessive bail.50 However, there is no federal constitutional right to
bail, and courts have found that bail that is far in excess of an
individualís ability to pay does not necessarily constitute excessive
bail.51 As a result, both the statutory and constitutional protections
against excessive bail are toothless, and the ìcrimeî of being too poor to
meet bail is a frequent occurrence ìpunishedî by pretrial detention.
United States v. Salerno is the seminal case in which the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of pretrial detention for those charged
with non-capital crimes.52 The Salerno Court found that pretrial
detention was justified because it was motivated by a ìregulatoryî
rather than a ìpunitiveî purpose.53 The Court held that:
Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as
punishment for dangerous individuals. Congress instead perceived
pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal
problem. There is no doubt that preventing danger to the community
is a legitimate regulatory goal.

The Salerno Court attempted to underscore this regulatory purpose by
noting that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires that detainees ìbe
housed in a ëfacility separate, to the extent practicable, from persons
awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending
45 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f)(2)(A) (2000); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49 (holding that the
Eighth Amendment is not violated if pretrial detention is based on the dangerousness of the
defendant); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (upholding the detention of a mentally
unstable individual who was deemed to pose a threat to the public); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715, 731-39 (1972) (upholding the detention of an individual deemed unfit for trial, yet still a
threat to public); Schall, 467 U.S. at 257 (upholding the detention of a juvenile deemed to pose a
threat to the public).
46 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f)(2)(B); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
47 See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 16; Bibas, supra note 4, at 2492.
48 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(c)(2).
49 See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 721 (2004).
50 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
51 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1979).
52 See id. at 741 (upholding pretrial detention against a facial challenge under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment).
53 See id. at 747; see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 257 (1984) (establishing the
regulatory/punitive distinction in the context of the pretrial detention of a juvenile defendant who
posed a risk to the community and holding that this detention did not violate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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appeal.íî54 The fact that placement in separate facilities from the
general prison population is not even legally required suggests that the
Courtís holding turns solely on the (presumed) intent of prosecutors and
judges, rather than the effects of detention on defendants. The irony is
that most prison systems in practice do not separate pretrial detainees
from the general prison population.55
This Article does not question the legitimacy of pretrial detention
as a tool to restrain defendants who pose an ongoing and immediate
danger to the community or to ensure defendantsí presence at trial. But
the distinction between a regulatory and punitive legislative purpose
overlooks the punitive effects of pretrial detention and the very real
costs that this ìregulatoryî measure inflicts on detained individuals,
their families, and the wider communities. Before parsing out the
punitive effects of pretrial detention, it is important to examine the bail
hearing process and the intent that the Salerno Court raised as an issue:
namely the incentives that prosecutors and judges face in the bail
hearing process.
3.

The Mechanics of the Bail Hearing Process

The Bail Reform Act of 1984 established the parameters for the
federal exercise of pretrial detention powers.56 An arresting officer
must ensure that the defendant appears before a federal magistrate judge
without ìunnecessary delay.î57 In practice, courts have held that bail
hearings must ordinarily take place within forty-eight hours of arrest
unless a continuance is granted to either party.58 The judge must make a
determination about whether and under what conditions to release the
accused.59 If the judge determines that there is ìclear and convincing
evidenceî that the accused poses a potential flight risk or constitutes a
danger to the community, then she may impose specific conditions for
54
55

See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (citing 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(1)(2)) (emphasis added).
Prison administrators generally consider pretrial detainees more dangerous than convicted
criminals because they have not yet become acclimated to the conditions of prison life. For this
reason pretrial detainees are often subjected to even greater restraints on their liberty than inmates
in the general prison population, who may enjoy more privileges because of their record as
prisoners. See Thomas M. Franklin & Victor C. Peters, Standards for Local Detention Facilities:
An Attempt at Statewide Management of Iowa County Jails, 66 IOWA L. REV. 1071, 1092-93
(1981).
56 See generally 18 U.S.C. ß 3142.
57 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
58 The time frame for a bail hearing generally parallels that for a hearing to determine
probable cause in the cases of warrantless arrest. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S. 44, 56 (1991). If the government fails to receive a probable cause determination within
forty-eight hours, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide
emergency or other extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 56-57; see also 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f)(2)
(stating that either party in a bail hearing may move for a continuance for up to five days).
59 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(a)-(f).
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release or deny bail entirely.60 The Bail Reform Act mandates that
these conditions should be the ìleast restrictiveî means that may
ìreasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the
safety of any other person and the community.î61 If no conditions can
reasonably safeguard against either of these risks, the judge must
subject the accused to pretrial detention without bail until trial.62
While the ability to deny bail entirely might appear to be the
greatest threat to individual liberty, the process of setting a dollar
amount for bail is the most important stage of the process for the vast
majority of detainees.63 In setting bail, judges are asked to balance the
liberty interest of the individual with a range of societal concerns.64
These four types of factors are the nature and circumstances of the
charges, the weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics of
the defendant, and the nature and seriousness of any threat the
defendantís release may pose to the community.65 Prosecutorsí
arguments and emphasis almost exclusively frame three of these factors,
and may significantly shape the judgeís understanding of the history and
characteristics of the defendant.66
Defense attorneys may introduce countervailing factors such as the
accusedís personal character, ties to the community, and substance
abuse record, but these factors carry far less weight than issues raised by
the prosecution.67 Judges may also consider the financial resources of
the defendant, which might appear key for determining the flight risk.68
60 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f)(2). The accused may be released on personal recognizance, or
courts may condition release on terms such as an unsecured bond, cash bond, or surety bond or
based on non-financial conditions such as house detention or submission of samples for ongoing
drug tests. The federal and state governments require a surety bond in the vast majority of cases.
See Eric Halland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private Law
Enforcement From Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & ECON 93, 94-96 (2004).
61 18 U.S.C. ßß 3142(c)(1)(B), 3142(e); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (ìBail set at a
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to ensure [the presence of the accused] is
ëexcessiveí under the Eighth Amendment.î).
62 18 U.S.C. ßß 3142(c)(1)(B), 3142(e). Legislative and judicial exceptions allow bail to be
denied outright in a number of contexts. These cases include charges related to capital offenses,
recapture, and criminal contempt, or other considerations of criminal history or the nature of
criminal charges. See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(c)-(e).
63 See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 16 (showing that five times more pretrial
detainees facing state felony charges lacked the means to meet bail than were denied bail
outright).
64 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(g).
65 See id.
66 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutorís Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 58-60 (1968) (arguing that the strength of the case is the prosecutorsí main consideration in
the charging, bail hearing, and plea bargaining process).
67 See Pat Raburn-Remfry, Expediting Arrest Processing, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLíY 121,
124-25 (1992); PAUL B. WICE, BAIL AND ITS REFORM: A NATIONAL SURVEY 14-15 (1973)
(noting that less than ten percent of judges, prosecutors, and defendants found that community
ties were an important consideration and that many found inquiring about community ties was a
ìwaste of timeî).
68 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(g)(3)(A).
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But judges need not even consider whether a defendant can actually
meet bail,69 and therefore consideration of the defendantís financial
circumstances appears to be a mere formality.70 The high volume of
bail hearings that judges face, the short time frame before the hearings,
the brevity of bail hearings, and the defendantís presumptive bias in
presenting evidence of risks means that bail inquiries concerning the
personal circumstances of the defendant are cursory and/or given little
weight.71 In contrast, judges generally place the greatest weight on
more ìobjectiveî bases laid out by the prosecution, such as the nature
and seriousness of the charges and the accusedís prior criminal record.72
As a result, courts routinely impose monetary bail that far exceeds
defendantsí means.73
In theory, the length of pretrial detention is limited by the Speedy
Trial Act, which mandates that cases concerning pretrial detainees occur
within ninety days.74 This protection is somewhat illusory as the
detention can be extended indefinitely if any one of eighteen openended exclusions is satisfied.75 These exclusions include a continuance
granted by a judge based on the interest of justice,76 the need to locate
an essential witness,77 or the filing of interlocutory appeals or pretrial
motions.78 As a result, pretrial detainees routinely face detentions that
well exceed the maximum of ninety days that the Speedy Trial Act
authorizes.79

69 In contrast, some states require judges to consider the actual ability of defendants to meet
bail. See, e.g., TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN art. 17.15 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2000).
70 See WICE, supra note 67, at 14 (noting that judges believed that the financial circumstances
of the defendant constituted the least important factor of the bail setting process).
71 See, e.g., id. at 24 (noting that bail hearings in Chicago averaged a mere fifty-seven
seconds).
72 See Ebbe Ebbeson & Vladimir J. Konecni, Decision-Making and Information Integration
in the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805 (1975) (discussing a
study that found that although judges claimed to consider a range of factors in setting bail, the
only factor that correlated with their bail decisions was the recommendation of prosecutors);
JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 154-55 (1979) (finding that objective factors, such as charges and the
defendantsí criminal history, appeared to be the most important considerations in judgesí
decisions concerning release and bail setting).
73 See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 16.
74 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3164(b) (2000).
75 See id.. ß 3161(h).
76 See id. ß 3161(h)(8).
77 See id. ß 3161(h)(3).
78 See id. ß 3161(h)(1)(E)-(F).
79 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2001 40 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0103.pdf (documenting
that the average length of federal pretrial detentions is eighty-one days for those who lack the
means to meet bail and one-hundred-and-ten days for those denied bail); Floralynn Einesman,
How Long is Too Long? When Pretrial Detention Violates Due Process, 60 TENN. L. REV. 1, 1416 (1992) (discussing the shortcomings in the design and application of the Speedy Trial Act that
result in significant numbers of detainees waiting more than ninety days for trial).
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4.

The Distorted Incentives Shaping Bail Hearings

This overview of the bail hearing process underscores the fact that
prosecutors play the primary role in molding the judgeís bail decisions.
Prosecutorsí charging power, indications of the strength of the case, and
framing of the defendantsí characteristics and potential threat to the
community in the bail hearing allow prosecutors to push for onerous
bail conditions.80 Prosecutorsí main leverage over defendants, both in
the bail hearing and plea bargaining processes, lies in the fact that
prosecutors enjoy sweeping discretion in charging defendants.81
Prosecutors have a wide and overlapping arsenal of criminal charges to
choose,82 and the strong judicial presumption that a prosecutor acts in
good faith all but inoculates charging decisions from judicial scrutiny.83
So long as a prosecutor can establish that probable cause exists for a
given offense, then a prosecutor is entitled to bring the charge.84
The lack of judicial oversight over charging means that defendants
face a highly uneven playing field, which legislatures have made even
more favorable to prosecutors in recent years. The legislative response
to popular concerns over criminal activity has been to create an
overlapping and ever increasing arsenal of crimes.85 This approach has
given prosecutors wider discretion in charging as even a single criminal
act may trigger multiple substantive charges as well as catch-all crimes,

80 See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2470-74 (2004); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and
Criminal Lawís Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2557-58 (2004).
81 See DAVIS, supra note 39, at 188 (arguing that ìthe American legal system seems to be
shot through with many excessive and uncontrolled discretionary powers, but the one that stands
out above all others is the power to prosecute or not to prosecuteî); Brown, supra note 37, at 331
(arguing that ìprosecutors have essentially no formal external checks on their discretionî).
82 See Gershman, supra note 14, at 405-06; ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE
JUDICIARY : PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 5 (1981) (arguing that the
prosecutor is treated as ìso integral and expert a part of the executive branch that he may not be
interfered with by the judiciaryî).
83 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (holding that there is no federal
constitutional right to any review of prosecutorsí charging decisions); see also Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing the
difficulties that judges would face even if they did seek to scrutinize prosecutorsí discretionary
charging decisions); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 558 (1996) (noting that ì[t]he commitment to prosecutorial discretion rules out
aggressive equal protection review of charging decisionsî).
84 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF íL
CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2000) (laying out the ethical principle that a prosecutor must ìrefrain from
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable causeî). But see
Bruce A. Green, Ethics 2000 and Beyond: Reform or Professional Responsibilty as Usual?
Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1588 (noting that prosecutorsí ethical
requirement only to raise charges supported by probable cause is a tautology as the law already
obliges prosecutors to adhere to this standard).
85 See Stuntz, supra note 83, at 507; Gershman, supra note 14, at 406-07.

17

L I BERT Y T AK I N G S
such as conspiracy or racketeering.86 Prosecutors routinely leverage this
discretion by overcharging in two ways: by raising charges that are
more serious than the facts may reasonably appear to justify and by
breaking offenses into overlapping and component parts.87
The enactment of the federal Sentencing Guidelines has provided a
powerful complement to overcharging.88 The Sentencing Guidelines
stripped judges of most of their discretion in sentencing by imposing
mandatory minimum sentences, and thus removed one of the last checks
on prosecutorial charging powers.89
Prosecutors can use the
combination of overlapping charges and mandatory minimum sentences
to seek high bail that is out of the reach of a large percentage of
defendants. By raising the specter of onerous sentences, prosecutors
can more effectively pressure defendants into plea bargaining and
exercise this leverage to all but dictate the contours of potential
punishment.90
86 While state criminal law broadly tracks the contours of common law offenses, the tangled
thicket of federal laws provides a particularly fertile field for prosecutors to employ overlapping
charges. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 14-15 (1996).
87 These two forms of overcharging are termed vertical and horizontal overcharging
respectively. See Meares, supra note 3, at 867-69.
88 Several recent Supreme Court decisions have cast some doubt on the future of the federal
Sentencing Guidelines and its state equivalents. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
738, 756-57 (2005) (holding that the Sentencing Guidelines constitute an advisory, rather than
mandatory system to guide judges in sentencing decisions); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.
2531, 2537-38 (2004) (holding that a state judge violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury by determining a sentence based on facts not reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496-98 (2000) (striking down part of a state
hate crimes statute that allowed judges to make findings of fact that could raise the potential
maximum sentence as a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury). But Justice
Breyerís opinion in Booker explicitly invited a legislative response to the Courtís limits on the
Sentencing Guidelines, Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768, and Congress may well enact legislation that
once again makes the Sentencing Guidelines binding on judges. Similarly, it is unclear whether
judges will exercise their new discretion and significantly depart from the Sentencing Guidelines.
See Henry Weinstein & David Rosenzweig, How Judges Will Use Discretion Is the Big Question,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A24.
89 See GEORGE FISHER, P LEA BARGAININGíS TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF P LEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA 223-29 (2003) (arguing that plea bargaining makes sentences more predictable and
greatly enhances incentives for defendants to plea bargain with prosecutors); Marc L. Miller,
Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1260 (2004)
(arguing that the ìthe reality of the federal system is that the sentencing power in individual cases
is overwhelmingly a function of the prosecutor aloneî); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1993) (arguing that the existence of the
Sentencing Guidelines means ìthe prosecutorís control over the charge is effectively control of
the sentenceî).
90 See Standen, supra note 89, at 1505-17; Miller, supra note 89, at 1253 (arguing that the
Sentencing Guidelines have dramatically increased the gap between the probable trial sentence
and the sentences from plea agreements, and thus enhanced incentives to plea). One indicator of
the power shift that the Sentencing Guidelines ushered in is the dramatic increase in plea
bargaining over the past twenty years. Guilty pleas resolved approximately eighty percent of
federal convictions in 1980. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
JUDICIAL FACTS & FIGURES, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.05.pdf (Mar.
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Prosecutors do not share a uniform interest in maximizing the
prison times of defendants.91 Political pressures, the culture of district
attorneyís offices, the prosecutorís reputation and ambitions, and the
prosecutorís personal views on the crime and the defendant all may
shape the charging, bail hearing, and plea bargaining decisions.92 But
what prosecutors do generally share is an interest in reducing everburgeoning case loads, which creates strong incentives to resolve cases
as rapidly as possible.93 Prosecutors also share an interest in securing
convictions. Non-prosecution poses salient reputational costs to
prosecutors, and losing cases taken to trial may pose an even greater
cost to prosecutorsí ambitions and reputations.94
In contrast,
prosecutors face no cost for raising as many charges as possible,

2003). Twenty years later after the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines, almost ninety-five
percent of convictions were resolved by guilty pleas. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 95 tbl. D-4 (2001),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.05.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
While the Sentencing Guidelinesí introduction of mandatory minimum sentences may or may not
have been the decisive factor in enhancing the incentives for plea bargaining, the increase in
prosecutorial power likely contributed significantly to this increase in plea bargains.
91 For an in depth discussion of the complex calculus of prosecutors, see Edward L. Glaser et
al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 259, 260-61 (2000); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating
Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 956-69 (1997); Brian Forst & Kathleen
B. Brosi, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 177, 183-91
(1977) (framing prosecutors as agents of the state and subject to similar problems of self-interest
in the exercise of their powers, abuse of powers, and failure to observe mandates that are
observed in other principal-agent contexts).
92 In contrast, the interests of criminal defendants are much simpler to capture as defendants
understandably seek to avoid or minimize their term of imprisonment. See Stuntz, supra note 80,
at 2554.
93 This point is evidenced by the fact that state court felony prosecutions more than doubled
from 1978 to 1991, while the number of prosecutors increased only just over fifteen percent from
1974 to 1990. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1984 189-90 tbl. 35; NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1991 37 tbl. 25; BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1990 2 (1992). In
more recent years the percentage increase in prosecutors has grown at approximately double the
rate of felony case growth, but prosecutors still face heavy case loads. See NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS : ANNUAL REPORT 1998 tbl. 15; 2003
tbl. 15 (documenting a 23% increase in state felony cases from 1988 to 2002); BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF PROSECUTORS
(May 2002) (documenting a 39% increase in the number of state prosecutors from 1992 to 2001).
Nonetheless, given the large caseload that prosecutors face, it is understandable how extensively
prosecutors continue to rely on plea bargaining and tools such as pretrial detention to facilitate
and expedite the plea bargaining process.
94 Both prosecutors and the general public appear to assess the success of prosecutors by their
conviction rate. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System,
17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 51 (1988); Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses
of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 337 (1990). Plea bargains that
dismiss the majority of charges help to secure a high conviction rate for prosecutors. In contrast,
the ratio of ìas charged convictionsî to convictions generally goes unnoticed by the public, even
though this figure may suggest overcharging. See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 35.
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charging for a given offense at a higher level than the facts may warrant,
and pushing for onerous bail terms that lead to pretrial detention.95
The liberal use of pretrial detention serves as a powerful tool to
advance prosecutorsí interests in dealing with cases expeditiously and in
ensuring convictions. Pretrial detention offers prosecutors tremendous
leverage over defendants, which they can in turn use to push for plea
bargains.96 Placing defendants ìon iceî in pretrial detention may
prevent a defendant from ìmeddlingî with witnesses or potential
evidence, may soften the accused up for a plea bargain, and may make it
far less likely that the accused can mount an effective defense.
Given prosecutorsí vast influence in bail hearings, prosecutors may
easily exaggerate the flight risk or threat to society posed by a defendant
to advance these illegitimate (and unspoken) motives by attempting to
make bail as high as possible. The danger of even one defendant
committing a high profile crime while released may also be enough to
cause judges and prosecutors to attempt to detain as many defendants as
possible.97 Prosecutors may face reputational costs in extreme cases of
misconduct that lead to extended pretrial detentions or false convictions,
but guilty pleas generally inoculate these decisions.98 While we can
safely presume that prosecutorsí incentives are generally not driven by
punitive motives towards the detained, it is clear prosecutors gain much
from stacking the deck against the accused in bail hearings.
Throughout the bail hearing and plea bargaining processes,
defendants may have few ways to offset prosecutorsí advantages,
especially if they have meager resources and are forced to rely on public
defenders, court appointed lawyers, or poor private representation.99
95 See Alschuler, supra note 66, at 85-105 (laying out the perverse incentives that prosecutors
have to overcharge defendants); Meares, supra note 3, at 867-72.
96 See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285-93 (discussing how charge bargaining serves as a means to gain
leverage over defendants in order to secure guilty pleas). Ironically, defendants may be squeezed
on both ends of the plea bargaining process as prosecutors and defense attorneys generally share
an interest in the certainty of plea bargains over the uncertainties of trials, regardless of the actual
guilt of defendants. See 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 131-32
(Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983).
97 Even if over ninety-nine plus percent of the time the government bail for defendants was
set excessively high, the small minority of incidents of released convicts committing crimes will
draw media attention and attract pressure to reduce the numbers of those released prior to trial.
See Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Prevention: Preventive Justice in the World of John
Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 372 (1970).
98 These reputational costs generally only fall on the shoulders of individual prosecutors
rather than on a prosecutorsí office as a whole. Even the aggregate of these effects on the
reputation of prosecutors does little to alter the great disadvantages that defendants face in bail
hearings and plea bargaining. See Standen, supra note 89, at 1486-88.
99 The fact that over half of criminal defendants are indigents that require government-funded
lawyers reinforces the fact that a large percentage of defendants are often too poor to meet bail.
See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense From a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52
EMORY L.J. 1169, 1169 (2003).
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The very people who might need the most zealous representation to
secure a financially viable bail may have their cases compromised
during both the bail hearing and plea bargaining process by the perverse
incentives of their overburdened and underpaid lawyers to spend as little
time as possible on their cases.100
One could argue that prosecutors do have some reputational
concerns that may dampen their incentives to abuse their charging
powers and to push for onerous bail conditions. Prosecutors are often
repeat players with judges, and their present and future career prospects
may turn on their reputation with the general public. However, the fact
that approximately ninety-four percent of convictions are resolved by
plea bargains means that prosecutorsí tactics are rarely subject to
outside scrutiny.101 Judges must formally confirm that a defendant is
making a knowing and intelligent plea, but this is generally a mere
formality.102 Reputational concerns with the general public also point
strongly towards prosecutorsí pushing for onerous bail conditions. In
this way, prosecutors can appear tough on criminals to build their public
image and to buttress their political ambitions.103 While courtroom
losses may inflict a reputational cost on prosecutors (and therefore
prosecutors rarely assume this risk), the public is unlikely to notice
dismissals of cases and guilty pleas to greatly reduced charges.104
100 Defense counsel for the indigent have economic incentives to settle because their
compensation is often based on the number of cases resolved. See id. at 1179-80 (2003). But the
heavy case loads that most defense lawyers face create stark incentives to plead most of their
clientsí cases away as soon as possible and to limit time spent in developing the cases in
anticipation of trial. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 33-34 (1997).
101 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS 95 tbl. D-4 (2001). Plea bargaining allows prosecutors to vindicate their prosecution
and bail hearing decisions based on post hoc admissions of guilt. Gerald Lynch sums up the
opaqueness of prosecutorsí actions in plea bargains best. ì[T]he defining characteristic of the
existing ëplea bargainingí system is that it is an informal administrative, inquisitorial process of
adjudication, internal to the prosecutorís officeóin absolute distinction from a model of
adversarial determination of fact and law before a neutral judicial decision maker.î See Gerard E.
Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1399, 1404 (2003).
102 Although judges formally review the validity of plea bargain agreements and can reject
prosecutorial sentence recommendations, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)-(f), in general judges rubber
stamp plea bargains. If there is any accountability to judges concerning charging strategies, it
would be most likely to occur only in the minute percentage of cases that go to trial.
103 The reputational benefits are obvious in the case of state prosecutors as ninety-five percent
of them are elected and presumably often hope to pursue reelection or other offices. See Robert
L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 734 (1996).
In contrast, federal prosecutors are appointed, rather than elected, but these positions are also
frequently leveraged to pursue further elected or appointed offices. See Daniel S. Medwed, The
Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV.
125, 151-56 (2004).
104 See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 73 n.167 (noting that the average dismissal rate is
twenty-seven percent of cases, but that it is difficult even to find statistics on the frequency of
guilty pleas in exchange for reduced charges).
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To the extent that judges do not defer to prosecutors in bail
determinations, judges also have independent incentives to impose high
bail. Like prosecutors, they too face burgeoning case loads and benefit
from the criminal justice systemís reliance on plea bargaining.105 To the
extent that excessive bail conditions expedite plea bargaining and
reduce over-burdened dockets, the judges are also direct beneficiaries.
Judgesí ambitions for higher judicial posts or for an (or another) elected
office may also cause them to err on the side of excessive bail.106
Otherwise, they may risk looking too soft on alleged criminals, as they
may face popular backlashes if the defendant disappears while on bail
or commits further crimes.107 In short, judgesí incentives largely
dovetail with those of prosecutors, and prosecutors have both the ability
and the incentives to drive the criminal justice systemís extensive
reliance on pretrial detention.

B.

The Dilemma Facing the Use of Pretrial Detention
1.

The Case For Pretrial Detention

Putting aside the incentives of prosecutors and judges for the
moment, it is clear that pretrial detention is a necessary evil in cases in
which no alternative can reasonably secure both public safety and the
accusedís presence at trial. Decisions to allow defendants out at all
may entail significant social costs. For example, approximately 200,000
felony defendants do not appear on their court date each year, and
60,000 stay on the run for over a year.108 Approximately thirty-two
percent of felony defendants engage in some form of misconduct while
out on bail, ranging from a failure to appear at their court hearing to
committing other criminal offenses.109 These costs may waste the time
105 See FISHER, supra note 89, at 116-36 (discussing how judgesí burgeoning case loads,
especially concerning civil suits, in the late nineteenth century led to judicial acquiescence to the
large-scale use of plea bargaining by prosecutors).
106 Since many state court judges are elected, the political considerations inherent in
discretionary judicial calculations may be more salient in their bail determinations. See
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION : STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL
SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 12 (expanded ed. 2001), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/CallToActionCommentary.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2005)
(noting that thirty-nine states have elections for selecting or retaining judges).
107 For example, the infamous ìWillie Horton adî was used to attack Democratic presidential
candidate Michael Dukakis during the 1988 presidential election for his parole policies while he
served as the governor of Massachusetts. The fear of an analogue to this ad for granting bail is
likely a factor in setting bail conditions at systematically higher levels than reasonably necessary
to secure the appearance of the accused at trial.
108 See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private
Law Enforcement From Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & ECON. 93, 93 (2004).
109 Twenty-two percent of those released on bail fail to appear for their court appearance, and
sixteen percent of released defendants were rearrested for committing new crimes while awaiting
trial. See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 21-22.
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of courts and lawyers who face delays, strain enforcement resources in
relocating absconded defendants, and increase risks inflicted on the
general public by potential crimes.110 These costs are significant
enough to make a strong case for pretrial detention, and any plan to
reduce reliance on pretrial detention may potentially magnify the social
costs caused by released defendants.111
Nonetheless, bail conditions that effectively imprison an individual
before conviction go squarely against the basic legal principle that an
individual is innocent until proven guilty.112 The denial of bail must be
based on ìclear and convincingî evidence of a serious flight risk or
threat to the community and the inability to find a less restrictive means
to safeguard against these risks.113 But this standard falls far below the
threshold of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for a criminal conviction.
Most importantly, judges fix the financial conditions for bail merely
based on a balancing test of governmental interests versus liberty
interests,114 yet these conditions may result in months to years of pretrial
detention because of the accusedís inability or failure to post bail. The
fact that the ìplaying fieldî of bail hearings and incentives of
prosecutors and judges are significantly skewed against the defendantís
liberty interests should be troubling because of the heavy burdens
pretrial detention places on unconvicted individuals.115
The stateís two compelling justifications for denying or imposing a
high bail are the stateís interests in ensuring the presence of the
defendant at trial and in protecting the community from any further
threat.116 The objective of preempting serious risks of violence is the
less controversial of these two justifications. As United States v.
Salerno posited, ì[t]he governmentís interest in preventing crime by
arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.î117 If the prosecution has
110
111

See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 108, at 94.
This point should not be overstated, as part of the problem lies in the legal systemís
reliance on monetary bail as the incentive to appear in court, rather than more extensively relying
on monitoring devices or other non-monetary incentives to secure a defendantís presence at court.
See JOHN CLARK & D. ALAN HENRY, THE PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISION MAKING PROCESS:
GOALS, CURRENT PRACTICES, AND CHALLENGES 12-13 (1996), available at
http://www.pretrial.org/ptrdecision1996.doc (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) (noting that approximately
thirty-six percent of defendants are released on their own recognizance or on financial bail, while
only thirteen percent of defendants are released subject to non-financial conditions such as
electronic monitoring).
112 Ironically, the federal statute on pretrial detention expressly states that ì[n]othing in this
section shall be construed as modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence.î 18 U.S.C. ß
3142(j). This language appears designed to forestall constitutional challenges on this ground.
However, pretrial detention compromises the presumption of innocence by inflicting a form of
punishment before conviction, which provides great incentives for false pleas to end or limit the
duration of detention.
113 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f)(2).
114 See id. ß 3142(g).
115 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 4, at 2491-93.
116 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f).
117 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1979).
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already established that probable cause exists that an individual
committed a violent offense, it is understandable for a judge to
determine that ìclear and convincing evidenceî exists that the societal
interest in precluding the possibility of harm outweighs the individualís
liberty interest. The power to deny bail on this ground may be easily
abused by judges and prosecutors because the standard of proof is so
low compared to that for a criminal conviction. But most in society
would understandably prefer to err on the side of caution when potential
violence is the concern.
The stateís interest in ensuring the defendantís presence at trial is
more problematic. The state does have legitimate interests in securing a
defendantís presence to satisfy justice in the given case and to uphold
broader deterrence concerns and respect for the criminal justice system.
But both the determinations of the probability of flight and the bail
required to minimize this risk are highly speculative and prone to abuse
by prosecutors.118 As discussed in the previous section, the catch-all of
securing the accusedís presence at trial may cover both judgesí and
prosecutorsí more informal and less palatable reasons that may motivate
the setting of high bail. But this potential for abuse does not negate the
fact that ensuring a defendantís appearance at trial is an important
government interest and that in some cases monetary bail and/or the
imposition of other conditions may not be reasonably adequate to secure
the defendantís appearance.
2.

Counting the Costs of Pretrial Detention

Societyís interests in preempting violence or reducing the risk of
flight may be significant enough in many cases to justify the imposition
of pretrial detention. However, what is undeniable in all pretrial
detention decisions is that someone must absorb the costs from a
decision to free or detain a defendant. Either the detainee must endure
imprisonment without conviction or compensation, or society must face
higher risks of criminal activity or flight if defendants who would
otherwise be detained are released prior to trial. The question is
whether this choice should be as stark as it currently is with the default
of detaineesí absorbing the costs for the sake of widely dispersed public
benefits. When a detainee is subsequently convicted of an offense, the
state can set off the sentence against time served and compensate
(although incompletely) for the burdens of imprisonment before
conviction.119 In extreme cases in which the state lacked probable cause
or engaged in egregious abuse, former detainees may have recourse to
118
119

See supra Sections I.A.3, I.A.4.
See 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b).
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Section 1983 actions or torts of false imprisonment, wrongful arrest, or
malicious prosecution.120
But detainees who are found not guilty are often left with the scars
from their imprisonment, no monetary compensation, and at best the
message that their state-mandated sacrifice served a public good.121
This approach seems unconscionable in the cases of truly innocent
individuals. But even in cases where a person is ultimately convicted of
a minor offense, one must still ask why such a person must absorb the
costs of pretrial detention. To place this point in context, the following
section will provide an overview of the primary costs that pretrial
detention inflicts.
Three main types of harms may arise from pretrial detention: the
personal costs of deprivation; a higher probability of conviction and a
longer sentence; and secondary societal harms. Some of these harms
may arise in the case of detention of any duration and others may
become more acute the longer the duration. Regardless of oneís views
on the merits of compensation, the costs are real and significant, and
pretrial detention inflicts these types of costs on both guilty and
innocent parties.
a.

The Personal Costs of Pretrial Detention

It is difficult to capture the full personal costs imposed by
detention on those who have yet to be convicted of any crime. Some
instances of detention can be dismissed as de minimis and absolutely
essential, such as the detention of prisoners who are arrested and
released within forty-eight hours or a marginally longer period of
time.122 Short-term needs for processing and case determination may
make detentions of limited duration essential for the criminal justice
system to function.123 As the discussion of the Bail Reform Act
highlighted, procedural and substantive safeguards ensure that detainees
are detained because of probable cause of having committed a criminal
offense coupled with a risk of flight, dangerousness to society, or both
120
121

See Bernhard, supra note 19, at 86-93.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE ß 1.1 (1968). (ìDeprivation of liberty
pending trial is harsh and oppressive in that it subjects persons whose guilt has not yet been
judicially established to economic and psychological hardship, interferes with their ability to
defend themselves and, in many cases, deprives their families of support.î).
122 The time frame for bail hearings generally parallels that for hearings to determine probable
cause in the cases of warrantless arrests. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44
(1991). If the government fails to receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other
extraordinary circumstances. Id.; United States v. Adekunle, 2 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1993).
123 Even if bail hearings in a given jurisdiction required more than forty-eight hours to process,
having compensation kick in at this early point would produce incentives for the expeditious
processing of defendants.
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most commonly and tragically an inability to make bail.124 While these
safeguards require the government to have a substantial basis for the
detention, these protections may offer cold comfort to innocent people
who face the personal costs inflicted by pretrial detention for any time
longer than a de minimis duration.
The personal costs of detention range from the demoralization
effects of being placed in alien surroundings, cut off from friends and
family, to the financial costs of loss of work, to the loss of reputation
and self-esteem.125 The psychological impact of the loss of liberty and
degradations of imprisonment may be incalculable, and detainees may
also face threats from other inmates, ranging from acts of humiliation to
physical violence or even rape.126 Even if the person is ultimately found
not guilty, the detention may have caused the defendant to lose her job,
to lose face and social standing in the community, and to face
significant dislocation costs in adjusting back to life on the outside.127
The irony of pretrial detention is that its effects may actually push
innocent people on the margins of society towards committing future
crimes upon their release by having strained or cut off detainees from
their families, jobs, and other social networks.128
A convicted party must face these costs as well. These costs are a
necessary consequence of imprisonment, however, and setting the time
served in pretrial detention against the ultimate sentence largely
mitigates these costs. A convicted person whose sentence is less than
the time served raises more troubling issues, although many of these
costs would arise from any substantial time in detention or prison. The
most troubling case of all is that of a person who is found to be innocent
and who would otherwise not have had to bear the personal costs of
detention. While the state may have had very legitimate reasons to
detain these innocent people, these innocent detainees have the strongest
claim to some form of redress.
b.

The Higher Probability of Conviction and Severity of Punishment

Concerns about pretrial detention should not be limited to
individuals found ultimately innocent. Numerous empirical studies
124
125
126

See supra Part I.A.3, I.A.4.
See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 517.
For an overview of the many risks that detainees may face in prison, see generally
MICHAEL C. BRASWELL ET AL., PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (2003). The recently enacted
federal Prison Rape Elimination Act notes that by conservative estimates thirteen percent of
inmates are sexually assaulted while in prison. See Adam Liptak, Ex-Inmateís Suit Offers View
Into Sexual Slavery in Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A1.
127 See ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE M AKING: P ATHWAYS AND
TURNING P OINTS THROUGH LIFE 163-69 (1993).
128 See id. at 167-68 (showing that that there is a statistically significant correlation between a
former inmatesí extent of community ties and the risk of committing another offense).

26

L I BERT Y T AK I N G S
have suggested that the longer a person spends time in pretrial
detention, the more likely she will be convicted and the more likely that
the sentence will be severe.129 These effects of pretrial detention appear
the same even after controlling for factors such as the seriousness of the
charges, prior convictions, and evidence against the defendant.130
Individuals fortunate or affluent enough to be free on bail enjoy
significant advantages in either staving off convictions or reducing their
ultimate sentences. They can enhance their credibility and appeal to
jurors or judges by acquiring or maintaining a job, earning money to
compensate victims, deepening their involvement in the community,
and even just through maintaining a healthier appearance by living at
home. As importantly, they have more opportunities to work with their
lawyer to pursue a vigorous defense, and they have greater incentives to
challenge prosecutors because imprisonment is a prospect rather than a
grim reality for them.131 In contrast, prosecutorsí ability to dangle the
carrot of release to pretrial detainees may distort defendantsí
decisionmaking and pervert justice by providing great incentives for
false guilty pleas to end or minimize the detention.132
The irony is that even defendants not subject to pretrial detention
face overwhelming incentives to plead guilty, especially in
misdemeanor cases, which makes the pressure facing pretrial detainees
appear even more stark.133 While the personal costs of detention may be
impossible to quantify fully, it is intuitive that a free man or woman
would have greater wherewithal to resist acquiescing to a plea as a way
129 See Stevens H. Clarke & Susan T. Kurtz, Criminology: The Importance of Interim
Decisions to Felony Trial Court Dispositions, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 476, 502-05
(1983) (confirming the strong correlation between the length of pretrial detention and the
likelihood of conviction and long sentences in a study of three counties in North Carolina);
FEELEY, supra note 4, at 236 (finding that approximately four times as many defendants are
detained prior to trial than are after conviction); John S. Goldkamp, The Effects of Detention on
Judicial Decisions: A Closer Look, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 234, 245 (1980) (confirming this same point
based on a study of Philadelphiaís criminal justice system); William M. Landes, Legality and
Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 333-35 (1974) (finding a
strong correlation between the length of pretrial detention and sentence length in New York City,
but attributing this fact to judgesí calculating bonds in ways that incorporate the probability of
acquittal).
130 See Charles E. Frazier & Donna M. Bishop, The Pretrial Detention of Juveniles and Its
Impact on Case Dispositions, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1132, 1139-52 (1985) (finding that
holding all other variables constant, detained juveniles were more likely to be convicted and to
face harsher sentences than those released on bail).
131 See Clarke & Kurtz, supra note 129, at 502; Patricia Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate
Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 632 (1964).
132 Paradoxically, one of the primary justifications for plea bargains is the fact that the
convicted criminals have admitted their guilt. But the ability of prosecutors to offer reductions in
the number and severity of charges the defendant faces, leniency in sentencing or release, and
non-prosecution of or leniency towards a defendantís friends or family may all but coerce a false
plea from a pretrial detainee. See Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutorís Dilemma: Bargains
and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 108-09 (2003).
133 See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendantís Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 951-55 (1983).
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of putting the ordeal behind them. While a free man or woman might
see a false guilty plea as a loss, a detainee may sacrifice his innocence
for the prospect of gaining freedom.134 These factors combine to
highlight why prosecutors have much to gain by setting bail high
enough to keep a given individual in prison, and why a defendantís bail
determination may have as much or more to do with the likelihood of
conviction and term of sentence as the ultimate plea bargain or trial.
c.

The Secondary Societal Costs

It would be unfortunate enough if detainees were the only
individuals who were forced to bear the costs from pretrial detention.
The problem is that the families of detainees and the wider community
must absorb much of the cost from defendantsí detention before trial.135
The detention of a loved one may have both significant psychological
and monetary impacts on many family members.136 Children may
suffer from both the absence of a detained parent, and from neglect
from other family members who may be forced to spread their attention
more widely or work to make ends meet.137 While defendants may bear
a social stigma from their detention, their family members and
especially their children share this shame and may face social
ostracism.138 The families of those who cannot meet bail are by
definition among the most economically vulnerable in society, and they
face the prospect of coping with even less resources because of the
detaineesí foregone employment.
The combination of these factors may push at-risk children of
detainees that much closer to the edge of temptation to engage in antisocial behavior.139 The public as a whole may be left footing the bill in
terms of greater Aid to Families with Dependent Children or greater
134 See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2514-15 (discussing how a pretrial detainee may be more likely
to view copping a plea through the lens of gain rather than through mitigating the degree of loss
like most defendants who are free on bail).
135 For an overview of these secondary societal costs of imprisonment, see John Hagan &
Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and
Prisoners, in 26 CRIME & JUSTICE : A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 121, 121-29 (Michael Tonry &
Joan Petersilia eds., 1999).
136 See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE ß 1.1 (1968) (noting that ìthe
maintenance of jailed defendants and their families represents major public expenseî).
137 See Donald Braman, Families & Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 117, 118-23 (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, ìItís a Family AffairîóThe
Incarceration of the American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV.
271, 271-72 (1994).
138 See Todd R. Clear, The Problem with ìAddition by Subtractionî: The Prison-Crime
Relationship in Low-Income Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 137, at 190-91.
139 See Jennifer Roback Morse, Parents or Prisons, 120 POLíY REV. 49 (2003); see also
Hagan & Dinovitzer, supra note 135, at 124-27.
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services for at-risk youth.140 Even worse, the use of detention as an
informal means of punishment may help to fuel criminal pathologies
and family breakdown by destabilizing families who are already on the
margins of society.141 These costs are not limited to the families
themselves, but may extend to entire communities whose social
networks and economy may be fractured by the disruptions and burdens
detention inflicts on individuals and families.142
The dislocation costs of detention for the detainee and the impact
on the wider communityís social capital and economy may be difficult
to quantify. These factors, however, also would weigh heavily on the
mind of detainees. If faced with the Hobsonís Choice of a long
detention in prison that may endanger their familyís well being versus
copping a false plea, many detainees may understandably choose the
latter as a lesser evil. While defendants must state in open court that
they recognize the implications of their decision to plead guilty to a
particular crime,143 the costs that pretrial detention inflicts on detainees
and their families may be the unspoken part of the story that makes
defendantsí decision to plead not truly voluntary and thus often perverts
our system of justice.

C.
1.

The Merits of Compensation

Potential Ways to Reduce the Reliance on Pretrial Detention

The costs that detention imposes on the state do create some
incentives for the federal and state governments to limit the denial of
bail or imposition of high bail. Governments face substantial costs in
detaining prisoners that are as or more costly than the incarceration of
convicted criminals for the same period of time.144 In theory, these
costs may exert a modicum of pressure on the federal and state
legislatures to change bail hearing rules to limit the use of pretrial
140
141

See Morse, supra note 139.
See MAUER, supra note 40, at 12 (discussing the significant impact incarceration has on
African-American families and communities).
142 Pretrial detention is obviously only part of a larger problem plaguing many urban
communities as convictions and even longer incarcerations may inflict an even greater harm on
communities. See Roberts, supra note 40, at 1015-20.
143 In federal court a judge must inform the accused of the nature of the charges and her rights,
confirm the voluntariness of the plea, and determine that the factual circumstances accord with
the plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
144 Federal and state costs per prisoner range from $30,000 to $50,000 per year. See Marilyn
D. McShane, Crowding, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 134, 134-35 (Marilyn D.
McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996). The costs are potentially higher in the pretrial
detention context because governments are obligated to make an effort to house detainees in
separate facilities from general prisoners. The shorter duration of the average pretrial detention
compared to the incarceration period for general prisoners may make sending pretrial detainees to
less costly corrections centers impractical.
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detention. Judicial cognizance of limited enforcement resources and
pressure from the legislature may provide a loose check on the overuse
of pretrial detention. But prosecutors and judges face little if any
accountability for the costs of maintaining pretrial detention facilities
and prisons.145 In an era where people are more willing to invest money
in building prisons than in building schools, increased expenditures for
detention centers appear to serve as a minor constraint, if any, on
legislatures, judges, and prosecutors in using pretrial detention.146 Since
the incentives of prosecutors and judges coalesce on using pretrial
detention to resolve cases expeditiously,147 the costs imposed by
detention serve as a weak check at best against using pretrial detention.
It is clear that the bail hearing and plea bargaining processes are
significantly stacked against defendants in ways that may pervert
justice, and that the costs of detention serve as a weak restraint on the
use of pretrial detention. Therefore, the question arises of how best to
level the playing field for defendants in these processes. Legislatures
have a variety of ways to pursue this end.148 One approach would be to
reform the bail hearing process. Legislatures could mandate that judges
examine the actual financial ability of a defendant to meet bail and
weigh this factor heavily when making bail calculations.149 Defendants
could also be provided with greater opportunities to present character
witnesses or other evidence of their ties to the community that would
merit a lower bail. While there may be cases in which judges intend to
place bail out of the hands of a defendant, heightening judicial
awareness of the ability to meet bail and the extent of community ties
may reduce the number of times when pretrial detention is a mere
product of the poverty of the accused. The stumbling block for this
approach may be the difficulties of actually determining the financial
ability to meet bail, the need for quick resolution of bail hearings
because of the sheer number of cases, and the strength of incentives that
judges and prosecutors may face to give lip service to these other factors
while making bail decisions based on the existing criteria.

145
146

See Standen, supra note 89, at 1499.
Even in times of state budget deficits, states have continued to maintain or increase prison
spending, because no governor wants to appear soft on crime. See John M. Broder, No Hard
Time for Prison Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, ß 4, at 5. However, with cash tight and
mandatory minimum sentences bolstering prison populations, some states have begun to
reconsider the costs and benefits of the sentencing policies that lead to long durations of
incarceration. See Fox Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail Terms, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at A1.
147 See infra Part I.A.4.
148 See Stephanos Bibas, Pleasí Progress, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1024, 1042 (2004) (arguing that
we need ìcounterweights and contrary incentivesî to check prosecutorsí power).
149 Under the current system, the federal government and most states are required to consider a
defendantís financial resources, see 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(g)(3)(A), but bail hearing statutes generally
do not require judges to consider the actual ability of a defendant to meet bail.
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Another possibility is to require prosecutors to release more
information about the case at the time of the bail hearing.150 There may
be frequent contexts in which the police have just made a spot arrest and
the prosecutors are still in the process of compiling a case at the time of
the bail hearing. But often arrests are the culmination of lengthy
investigations, and requiring more extensive disclosures by prosecutors
at or before a bail hearing should often be a realistic objective. This
approach may strengthen the hands of defense attorneys and allow
judges to make a more informed decision in bail hearings. The problem
with this approach may be that it may end up significantly delaying bail
hearings and that it may be difficult to monitor whether prosecutors
have made the required disclosures.151
Another avenue of reform would be to strengthen judicial oversight
of prosecutors. Loosening the vice-like-grips that the Sentencing
Guidelines impose on judgesí discretion in sentencing would go far in
checking prosecutorsí charging power.152 By opening up more
exceptions to mandatory minimum sentences, judges might be able to
temper some of prosecutorsí power in plea bargaining and provide
defendants with more reason to hope for leniency if the case went to
trial.153 Another approach to temper prosecutorsí ability to push for
onerous bail conditions would be to heighten judicial scrutiny of
charging decisions or to reduce judicial deference to prosecutors in the
bail setting process. There is no reason to believe that courts are not
capable of reviewing prosecutorsí decisions, as courts routinely review
a wide range of discretionary decisions by elected and bureaucratic
officials.154
150 See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2531-32 (noting that the current system places few requirements
on federal prosecutors to release information to defendants prior to trial).
151 For example, prosecutors may strategically decide not to process exculpatory or mitigating
information until after the bail hearing to keep the information out of the hands of defendants. It
will be difficult if not impossible for defendants to discover violations of this disclosure rule as
the prosecutor has sole possession of evidence and other relevant information, and the defendant
and court may never learn of information that is wrongly withheld. This same critique could
apply to whether prosecutors complied with Brady disclosures before trial. However, the
difficulty of establishing the timing of whether a prosecutor learned of information prior to the
bail hearing would make it even more difficult to determine whether a prosecutor complied with a
pre-bail hearing disclosure requirement.
152 See Miller, supra note 89, at 1260 (arguing that one way to check prosecutorial power over
sentencing is to give a variety of actors including judges more power over sentencing decisions).
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has moved in the direction of vesting greater discretion in the
hands of judges by holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, rather than binding on
sentencing decisions. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005). Whether
Congress effectively reverses this decision through new legislation or judges will actively
exercise this sentencing discretion remains to be seen. See id. at 768 (Justice Breyerís noting that
the Supreme Courtís decision concerning the Sentencing Guidelines ìis not the last word: The
ball now lies in Congressí courtî).
153 See Standen, supra note 89, at 1532-36.
154 See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary
Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 47, 48-49 (2000).
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While heightening judicial scrutiny of prosecutorsí charging
decisions would be quite appealing, there are a myriad of obstacles that
may make greater scrutiny of prosecutorsí decisions impractical. These
include the intrusiveness of judicial supervision of prosecutors,155 the
challenges in implementing effective relief for prosecutorsí raising
frivolous charges or failing to charge,156 the difficulties in setting a
standard of review for overseeing exercises of prosecutorial
discretion,157 and the question of who should have standing to challenge
prosecutorsí decisions.158 In contrast, mandating greater scrutiny of
prosecutorsí recommendations at the bail hearing appears to have
greater potential to temper prosecutorsí power. However, the incentives
judges themselves face to deal with cases as quickly as possible may
frustrate this approach.
Legislatures could also seek to target prosecutorial charging
discretion more directly. They could simplify the system of criminal
laws to eliminate duplicative and overlapping charges.159 This would
help prevent the types of overcharging that can easily ratchet up
prosecutorsí bail recommendations. Another approach would be for
legislatures to mandate that prosecutors adopt a more structured and
reasoned charge selection process to heighten initial screening and seek
to achieve greater proportionality between the alleged crime and the
charges raised.160 Legislatures could enact formal guidelines to channel
exercises of prosecutorial discretion,161 call for prosecutors to subject
charging decisions to a higher standard than probable cause,162 or divide
charging, bail hearing, and plea bargaining decisions between different

155 See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380-81 (2d Cir.
1973) (discussing the difficulties that judges would face even if they did actively attempt to
scrutinize prosecutorsí discretionary charging decisions).
156 The issue of remedies would be difficult in challenges to non-prosecution for particular
charges because prosecutors could then half-heartedly pursue those charges and undercut the
effectiveness of the remedy. Alternatively, if a remedy entailed striking particular charges at the
preliminary hearing or bail hearing, it might have perverse effects of causing prosecutors to dig in
their heels with their remaining charges and to counter any setbacks by more zealously
prosecuting affected defendants.
157 In particular, it is difficult to imagine what the standard should be for considering potential
equal protection violations concerning prosecutorsí charging decisions. See McKleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 291-97 (1987).
158 See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (ì[A] private citizen lacks a
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.î).
159 See Bibas, supra note 148, at 1042.
160 See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 51-58 (arguing that enhanced initial screening offers
a way to encourage prosecutors to charge defendants more accurately and to reduce reliance on
plea bargaining).
161 See Vorenberg, supra note 39, at 1560-72 (calling for guidelines to limit the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion); DAVIS, supra note 39, at 188-214 (initiating the call for formal
guidelines for channeling exercises of prosecutorial discretion).
162 See Meares, supra note 3, at 874-75 (arguing for financial incentives for prosecutors to
subject evidence to a higher standard than probable cause to justify charging defendants).
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actors within a given prosecutorsí office.163 The challenge facing these
types of internal reforms is the difficulty of monitoring prosecutorial
compliance, as much of each proposalís effectiveness may turn on
whether the head prosecutors actively seek to oversee these plans and
other prosecutors embrace these reformsí underlying purpose.
However, regardless of the efficacy of each of these reforms, any or all
of these measures would represent steps of progress towards tempering
prosecutorial power.
Lastly, legislatures could bolster the power of grand juries, which
after all were originally intended to serve as a ìprotector of citizens
against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action.î164 In practice,
grand juries serve only as a weak and often formalistic check on
prosecutors as ìgrand jurors hear only what the prosecution wants them
to hear.î165 Reforming the institution of the grand jury could fill many
articles in itself,166 but the uncertainties inherent in overhauling as weak
and malleable an institution as the grand jury makes this seem a
speculative approach to tempering prosecutorsí powers.167 All of these
potential reforms to level the playing field for defendants may represent
steps of progress. However, these measures may provide grim solace
for the many people who are never convicted yet are subjected to pretrial detention for weeks or months and receive nothing in the end
except for the restoration of their freedom.

163 See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 56-57; H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor:
The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1714-18
(2000).
164 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). In the federal system, the U.S.
Constitution mandates the indictment by a grand jury for felony crimes. See Stirone v. United
States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1961); FED R. CRIM. P. 7(a). Only about half of states require a grand
jury indictment for serious felonies, and less than a third for all felonies. See SARA SUN BEALE &
WILLIAM C. BRYSON, 1 GRAND JURY LAW & PRACTICE ßß 2.03-2.04 (1996).
165 Andrew Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 260, 267 (1995); R. Michael Cassidy, Towards a More Independent Grand
Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutorís Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 13 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 361, 361-62 (2000).
166 See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 819-20 (2003) (calling for a bar on the admission of hearsay evidence
in grand jury proceedings to heighten the burden on the prosecution); Ric Simmons, Reexamining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82
B.U. L. REV. 1, 71-74 (2002) (calling for a range of reforms to allow grand jury members to
function as more active participants in grand jury proceedings).
167 For states that do not employ the grand jury system, preliminary hearings serve as the
screen for criminal charges. While preliminary hearings have the advantages of an adversarial
process and a public hearing before a judge, they also serve as a fairly weak check on the
prosecution. See DEBORAH DAY EMERSON & NANCY L. AMES, THE ROLE OF THE GRAND JURY
AND THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN PRETRIAL SCREENING 68 (1984). Strengthening scrutiny of
prosecutorsí charging decisions in this setting may also suffer from many of the same
uncertainties facing reform in the grand jury context.
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2.

The Benefits of Compensating Pretrial Detainees

While these alternatives offer some prospect of limiting
prosecutorsí power, this Article will argue that raising the cost of
pretrial detention through compensating detainees may offer the best
prospect of both justly treating the accused and diminishing the criminal
justice systemís extensive reliance on pretrial detention. As noted
earlier, this objective of compensating detainees through a cause of
action for liberty takings can be reframed as compensating more
detainees more adequately. The federal government and many state
governments already provide an incomplete form of compensation for
two classes of detainees. Detainees who are later convicted have their
time served in detention offset against their sentence.168 Innocent
victims of egregious government action have recourse to a number of
causes of action for redress including ß 1983 actions and torts for
wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.169 The
underlying logic of this ìsystemî is that fairness dictates that convicted
detainees should not be punished twice. More importantly, the existing
causes of action utilize liability rules to deter governmentís most
egregious abuses of pretrial detention powers and to compensate those
affected by these abuses.
The common theme of the existing cause of actions is the narrow
class of detainees that they protect, because they only offer redress for
the most egregious government actions. For each cause of action, the
existence of probable cause inoculates the government from liability for
the arrest and the pretrial detention.170 For example, to prove malicious
prosecution, a claimant must establish the initiation of a prosecution
against her, termination of the prosecution in her favor, a lack of
probable cause, and the existence of actual malice.171 To prove false
imprisonment, a claimant must prove she was knowingly and
intentionally confined against her will without legal justification, but
probable cause serves as a full defense.172 Similarly, a ß 1983 action
against state and local officers alleging the deprivation of civil rights
through pretrial detention will not succeed if the initial arrest was made
with probable cause.173
168
169
170
171

See 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b).
See Bernhard, supra note 19, at 86-93.
See id. at 86.
See Bonide Products, Inc. v. Cahill, 223 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Murphy v.
Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting a plaintiff also needs to establish a Fourth
Amendment violation to prevail on a ß 1983 action based on a claim of malicious prosecution).
172 See Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 761 N.E.2d 560, 564-65 (N.Y. 2001).
173 See 42 U.S.C. ß 1983 (2000); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (ìA peace officer
who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the
innocence of the suspect is later proved.î); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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Having probable cause for the arrest and detention serve as the
boundary line for financial compensation only allows a narrow sliver of
detainees access to full compensation for their detention.174 While these
causes of action exist to deter egregious state activity and to compensate
those affected, these limits fail to do much of either in the context of
pretrial detention. The existence of probable cause may be enough to
vindicate arrests and prosecutions of innocent defendants in spite of the
financial and reputational costs such acts inflict. But making financial
compensation for pretrial detention turn on the existence of probable
cause seems more unjust because of the much greater burden placed on
detainees and prosecutorsí incentives to exploit pretrial detention
without compensation to make their prosecutions and plea bargaining
quicker and easier.
The current system offers no recourse at all for innocent detainees
who were not victims of the most egregious government actions. Even
those convicted detainees who receive a set-off for their time served are
systematically undercompensated. Empirical studies have repeatedly
borne out the common sense insight that those mounting a defense
behind prison walls suffer disadvantages that significantly increase their
probability of being convicted or having to cop a guilty plea.175
The challenge is to construct a system of compensation that more
accurately accounts for the costs inflicted on pretrial detainees.176 In the
case of detainees who are ultimately convicted, proving the impact of
this disadvantage in any given case may be as hard to establish as racial
bias in a death penalty case.177 Statistically, the disadvantage may exist
in both cases, but the statistical determinations cannot show whether the
given disadvantage was present or conclusive in any given case.178
One approach to remedy the disadvantages that pretrial detainees
face would be systematically to ìcompensateî convicted detainees, by
providing a greater offset against their sentence than the actual time
served based on an across the board fixed percentage. This may be
174 Because an absence of probable cause is hard to prove except in the most egregious cases,
even the sliver of detainees who would fall in this category may have difficulty successfully
pursuing this claim.
175 See Clarke & Kurtz, supra note 129, at 502-05; Goldkamp, supra note 129, at 245; Rodney
J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer: Zealous Advocate, Double Agent, or Beleaguered
Dealer?, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 419, 438 & n.68 (discussing how an Ohio county frequently detained
misdemeanor defendants for longer than their potential sentences, which produced incentives for
plea bargains for time served).
176 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 414 (questioning whether money and constitutional harms
are in any way commensurable such that monetary damages can truly compensate for the harm
inflicted by the constitutional wrong).
177 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 325-27 (1987); see also Roberts, supra note 40, at
1006-07 (2001) (arguing that the disproportionate incarceration of African-Americans stems from
a complex interplay of biased decisionmaking by individual actors and systemic factors that
statistically suggest a racial injustice, but which is extremely difficult to prove in individual
cases).
178 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 318-19.
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politically controversial, and the uncertainties of whether the detention
resulted in a wrongful conviction or a longer sentence in a given case
may make it too sweeping a remedy that is either too generous or too
inadequate in any given case. A modified approach would be to vest
judges with discretion to reduce sentences for those who faced
significant periods of pretrial detention prior to conviction and could
demonstrate significant resulting disadvantages in defending
themselves.179 This would be an extension of the existing bases under
the federal Sentencing Guidelines which allow judges to reduce
sentences in limited circumstances.180 Empowering judges to exercise
this discretion would open up the possibility for judges to redress some
of the more obvious cases of disadvantage caused by pretrial detention.
This would be a clear improvement, but it may prove to be a tool of
limited efficacy as both the state as a whole and judges may have little
incentive to employ this discretionary power to reduce sentences.181
While either of these steps may help convicted detainees, nothing
short of financial compensation for innocent detainees may both
adequately compensate innocent detainees for the costs of detention and
at least partly deter state actors from excessive reliance on pretrial
detention.182 ìLiberty takingsî sets out to fill this need by analogizing
the taking of people to the taking of property. Existing takings case law
provides a set of principles for framing when compensation would be
appropriate in the pretrial detention context. By having compensation
turn on the detention itself, rather than on the probable cause for the
arrest and detention, liberty takings will seek to provide a financial
disincentive for relying on pretrial detention. As the following section
will show, either the analogy to physical or regulatory takings could

179 One could argue that the disadvantages posed by pretrial detention merit some form of
compensation for all detainees. One class of individuals is subjected to a loss of liberty to
enhance the welfare of society. In contrast, those free on bail impose greater risks on society (in a
statistical sense at least), yet enjoy significant advantages in defending their cases.
180 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the primary justifications for reducing a sentence are
substantial assistance to the government in the given prosecution or related prosecutions and the
defendantís contrition. See 18 U.S.C. ß 3553(e) (2000); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ß 5K1.1 (2003).
181 Given how judges are some of the strongest critics of the constraints imposed by the
Sentencing Guidelines, there is reason to expect that judges would welcome greater sentencing
discretion in this area. See Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the
Retirement Decisions of Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231, 235 (2004) (noting how in a
1997 survey eighty-six percent of federal judges felt that the Sentencing Guidelines had vested
too much power in prosecutors and eighty percent of judges expressed the desire for greater
sentencing discretion).
182 It is difficult to gauge to what degree compensation for liberty takings will successfully
deter state actors from relying on pretrial detention in cases when less restrictive alternatives are
viable. However, the combination of liberty takings with complementary efforts to shape
prosecutorsí and judgesí incentives may offer ways to reduce the stateís reliance on pretrial
detention. See infra Section II.C.4.
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serve as a foundation to ground a new statutory cause of action for
liberty takings.

1.

III.

THE CASE FOR LIBERTY TAKINGS

A.

The Liberty Takings Framework

The Analogy Between the Taking of Property and the Taking of
People

The Fifth Amendment establishes that no person shall ìbe deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.î183 The
constitutional textís use of liberty and private property in the same
sentence suggests that these two concepts have independent
significance. Courts have never recognized a ìproperty right over oneís
own personî or applied the takings clause to the deprivation of
liberty.184 Nonetheless, a strong analogy can be drawn between the
taking of property and the taking of people,185 and the reasoning of
takings case law can provide an appropriate framework for
compensating pretrial detainees.
While the idea of liberty obviously cannot (and should not) be fully
reduced to the sum of its economic parts,186 aspects of liberty can be
conceptualized as forms of property that people choose to employ in
markets or to withhold from markets every day. Strictly speaking, a
person cannot literally sell oneís liberty.187 But the ability to contract
183
184

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Margaret Radin has argued ìthe body is quintessentially personal property because it is
literally constitutive of oneís personhood.î Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 957, 965-66 (1981) (arguing that Lockean analysis establishes self-ownership in oneís
body).
185 Other scholars have recognized that the Takings Clause could serve as a springboard for
calling for compensation in cases of deprivations of liberty. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 293-94 & n.99 (1997)
(noting that the Takings Clause provides a potential principle for compensating JapaneseAmerican detainees during World War II); Kontorovich, supra note 9, at 790-91 (arguing that
judges should have the ability to provide monetary relief in extraordinary circumstances, such as
mass detentions during a national security crisis); Wenger, supra note 9, at 192-93 (framing
slavery as a form of takings).
186 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 414-15.
187 Of course, this limitation is only a matter of contemporary law, as indentured servitude is a
ìtime-honoredî American tradition that lives on through the underworld economy of large-scale
human trafficking. Often the quid pro quo for securing illegal entry is years of almost complete
deprivations of liberty by unscrupulous employers. See, e.g., Peter Landesman, The Girls Next
Door, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, ß 6 (Magazine), at 30 (discussing how it is estimated that there
are 30,000 to 50,000 illegal aliens in the United States who have been forced to work as
prostitutes to earn their passage).
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with an employer or to engage in non-market activities, such as care for
a child or elderly parent, housework, or leisure, are all derivative of
personal liberty. While the state has sweeping powers to regulate and
even ban economic and non-economic activities, the defining features of
liberty are the individualís freedom from complete control or
occupation by the state and the right to exercise that liberty in markets
or in the private sphere.188 These features of liberty distinguish a free
man from a slave, and can generally be forfeited to the state for periods
of time only because of convictions for criminal acts.189
English and American history is replete with examples of more
stark acknowledgements that property interests are intimately
intertwined with liberty. For example, during the height of the feudal
era, no man was his own master save the King.190 Serfs were literally
part of their lordsí estate, and their liberty as economic actors was
limited to the residual of time after the fulfillment of their feudal
duties.191 During the first 250 years of American history and for over
seventy years after the ratification of the Constitution, private property
rights over the liberty and labor of slaves were given the full protection
of the law.192 For much of the same period indentured servants
frequently contracted out their liberty for fixed periods of time in
exchange for the passage to the New World.193 In England, through the
early nineteenth century, convicts, including even vagrants, could be
sold as indentured servants, because their criminal acts forfeited their
property rights over their own person for the period of their sentence.194
Debtorsí prisons were once a symbol in the United States of how even
free men could forfeit their liberty due to no criminal act, but simply
because of their failure to pay debts.195
188 Obviously, the state limits our autonomy through laws and regulations; individuals
voluntarily curtail their autonomy through contractual labor; and our neighbors, friends, and foes
shape our lives in limited senses through social norms. The idea of control used in this Article,
however, suggests comprehensive or near total control or ownership by one person over another.
189 Certain exceptions exist such as jury duty and military conscription. While compensation
for both jury duty and military service may often seem nominal particularly in relation to the risks
of military service, these burdens carried by the few for the sake of many are both less
comprehensive in scope and generally better compensated than pretrial detention.
190 Each individual enjoyed control of his land, personal property, and ultimately himself only
at the deference of his feudal lord. This order was symbolized by the Kingís ultimate ownership
of all land. See Richard Rivera, Evolution of Landlord & Tenant Law, 6 PLI/NY 7, 14-16 (1997).
191 See Irma W. Merrill, Landlord Liability for Crimes Committed Against Third Party
Tenants, 38 VAND. L. REV. 431, 433 (1985).
192 See Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth
Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 313-22 (2004).
193 Indeed, many illegal immigrants to the United States continue to engage in indentured
servitude to the present day as the price for their passage. See Landesman, supra note 187.
194 In the United States the even more sinister analogue to these laws was the enactment of
ìBlack Codesî in many southern states following the civil war. These laws made indentured
servitude the punishment for vagrancy and targeted the newly freed African-Americans. See
W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 167-75 (1962).
195 Debtorsí prisons existed in Massachusetts until 1857, and they had been fixtures of early
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The Thirteenth Amendment formally abolished the full alienability
of liberty as a form of property.196 However, this Amendment did not
change the tight interconnection of liberty and property as we all ìsellî
our liberty at fixed increments as employees or entrepreneurs. What the
Thirteenth Amendment did was to make the full deprivation of liberty a
state monopoly that can only be used for limited public purposes.197
These deprivations of liberty are not limited to pretrial detention. Jury
duty, the military draft, forced confinement, and/or submission to
vaccinations in times of plagues are all examples of civic duties that
may entail literal physical occupations by the state over the
individual.198
Because of the close interconnection of liberty and property, it is
intuitive that an analogy can be drawn between the taking of property
and the taking of people by the state. The former is a case of taking
physical capital, while the latter is a case of taking human capital and all
of the productivity and potential it may entail. Just as in the taking of
real property, the mere fact that the detention may be in the public
interest and accord with due process should not obscure the very real
costs it inflicts on detainees, and the resulting need for compensation.
To some, equating liberty with a property interest might denigrate the
significance of this core American principle. However, the current
system of treating the liberty of a detainee as a non-compensable, nonproperty interest that can be seized by the state appears even more
insulting to the dignity of an individual and to the idea of liberty itself.
2.

An Overview of Physical and Regulatory Takings

To explain how the reasoning from takings law doctrine could
provide a framework for delineating what constitutes liberty taking, it is
necessary to provide a brief overview of takings doctrine. The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from taking
private property for public purposes without offering just
compensation.199 Two major branches of takings law exist: physical
takings and regulatory takings.200 The federal government must give
owners just compensation whenever the government physically seizes
American society through the early decades of the nineteenth century. See CHARLES WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 52 (1935).
196 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
197 See Standen, supra note 89, at 1472-75 (framing the state as a monopsonist of criminal
justice powers and prosecutors as its primary agents).
198 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1081, 1096-97 (1999) (noting that courts have applied civic duty analysis to
appropriations of personal time and labor).
199 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
200 See FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 2-6.
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or occupies private property, regardless of the economic impact.201
Landowners face a much higher burden in the context of regulatory
takings, however, as they must either show that the regulation precludes
any economic value or use of property or prevail in a balancing test
weighing the governmentís interest and means chosen versus the
economic impact of the regulation.202
The permanent physical seizure or occupation of property by the
state has long been recognized as a per se taking, which requires just
compensation.203 The seminal contemporary case for permanent
physical takings is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
which affirmed that the prohibition against the permanent occupation of
property by the state without just compensation is almost absolute.204 In
this case a permanent taking was found even in the absence of a
showing of economic damage because of a city mandate that an
apartment building owner allow a third party to permanently install a
cable television antenna.205 The Loretto Court concluded that ìa
permanent physical occupation of anotherís propertyî is ìperhaps the
most serious form of invasion of an ownerís property interests.î206
A per se rule of compensation also applies to temporary seizures or
occupations of land if the state exercises the effective rights of
possession.207 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Supreme
Court affirmed that ìcompensation is mandated when a leasehold is
taken and the government occupies the property for its own purposes,

201 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). The
federal government and state governments also face a ìpublic use or purposeî requirement that
theoretically serves as a barrier to takings. But in practice this barrier is generally a formalistic
limit to takings as almost any government occupation of property may be framed as advancing the
public interest. The Supreme Court is currently considering whether and how a state actor can
satisfy the public use or purpose requirement if it condemns private property in the name of
economic development in order to transfer the property to another private party. See Kelo v. City
of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 527-29 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
202 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Commín, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
203 See Michelman, supra note 8, at 1184 (arguing that ì[t]he one incontestable case for
compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately
brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, ëregularlyí use, or ëpermanentlyí occupy,
space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under private ownershipî); see also
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regíl Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321
(2002) (ì[The] plain language [of the Fifth Amendment] requires the payment of compensation
whenever the government acquires private property for a public purpose.î).
204 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (recognizing a
permanent physical takings in the governmentís use of private airspace for the approach to a
government airport); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (initially establishing the
permanent physical takings doctrine).
205 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433-38.
206 See id. at 435.
207 See id. at 435 n.12; see also United States. v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380-81
(1945) (finding compensation due for complete physical occupation of property even if the taking
is only for one day).
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even though that use is temporary.î208 However, not every ìtemporary
physical invasionî is a taking, as there may be circumstances of very
short duration, such as state responses to intermittent floods, which may
require temporary and partial government entry of private land for
public purposes.209 In these cases of temporary occupations of property
that ìdo not absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and
exclude others from his property,î takings claims should be determined
based on a balancing test of government and landowner interests.210
This test is presumably analogous to the Penn Central test for
regulatory takings, which is discussed later in this section.211
The notable exception to physical takings is the civil or criminal
forfeiture of property212 used in or purchased with the proceeds of
specified illegal acts, such as drug trafficking or the traffic in illegal
aliens.213 Civil and criminal forfeiture laws date almost to the founding
of the United States,214 and are based on the premise that the criminal
acts forfeit the criminalís right to the fruits of her crimes or to the
instruments that facilitated the criminal activities.215
Regulatory takings are of a more recent vintage than physical
takings.216 The existence of regulatory takings stems from attempts by
judges to balance the Takings Clauseís commitment to protecting
private property with the rise of the administrative state and the
pervasive regulation of property rights.217 Justice Holmesí famous
analysis in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon captures the uncertainties
with which judges have grappled in defining regulatory takings.218
Justice Holmes established that ì[t]he general rule at least is, that while
208 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322; see also United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S.
114, 115 (1951); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 (1946); General Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. at 380-81.
209 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
210 See id. at 435 n.12.
211 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (laying out the
regulatory takings balancing test).
212 Criminal forfeiture proceedings are in personam against a given criminal offender, while
civil forfeiture proceedings are in rem actions against the targeted property that was used to
facilitate a crime or the fruits of a criminal offense.
213 For example, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, 511, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. ß 881 (1988)),
empowered federal officers to proceed in rem against illegal drugs, as well as facilities used for
their manufacture or transport. Over time, the federal governmentís power has been expanded to
allow civil forfeiture in other drug-related areas, such as the seizure of any property, real or
personal, used in money laundering. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. ß 981 (2000)).
214 See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993) (noting that ì[t]he First
Congress passed laws subjecting ships and cargos involved in customs offenses to forfeitureî).
215 See David Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. 328, 386 n.269 (1988).
216 See generally Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (establishing the existence of
regulatory takings).
217 See FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 20-21.
218 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
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property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking.î219 Judges have admittedly had
difficulty determining precisely what ìtoo farî is, and the uncertainties
about the outer limits of regulatory takings have fueled vigorous
debate.220
The fact that a haze may surround the outer limits of regulatory
takings obscures the fact that there is a clear category of regulations that
constitute regulatory takings. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Commission established a categorical rule that ìwhen the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial
uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.î221 This categorical form of
regulatory taking is a direct analogue to physical takings as it represents
the stateís constructive occupation of land through regulation rather
than physical seizure.
This standard is difficult for landowners to meet because
oftentimes a regulation precludes many, but not all, of the beneficial
uses of a property. However, only complete deprivations of all
economically beneficial uses or value constitute a categorical regulatory
taking.222 As significantly, the Supreme Court has chosen not to apply a
per se rule to temporary regulatory takings, but instead held in TahoeSierra that a regulation which has ìeffected a temporary taking ërequires
careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.íî223
If a regulation only temporarily or partly eliminates a propertyís
economic use or value, then the Court must use ìessentially ad hoc,
factual inquiriesî and balance public and private interests to determine
if a regulatory taking has occurred.224 The Penn Central balancing test
requires courts to consider the nature of the government action, the
public benefits, and the economic impact on and the reasonable
investment-backed expectations of the landowner.225 In practice, courts
219
220

Id. at 415.
See, e.g., Rose, supra note 10, at 562 (criticizing ambiguity in the regulatory takings
doctrine); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1697, 1711 (1988) (arguing that there is a need for a more comprehensive approach to
regulatory takings).
221 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Commín, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
222 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regíl Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 330 (2002) (stressing that the Supreme Courtís holding in Lucas ìwas limited to ëthe
extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is
permittedíî) (citations omitted); see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (noting that
ìwhere an owner possesses a full ëbundleí of property rights, the destruction of one ëstrandí of the
bundle is not a takingî).
223 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (denying a temporary regulatory taking for a temporary
government ban on land development) (quoting Palazolla v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636
(2001) (OíConnor, J., concurring)).
224 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
225 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125-27.
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have often been deferential to the government when applying this
balancing test to a regulation that deprives an owner of less than the
almost complete beneficial use or value of the property.226
3.

Providing a Grounding for Liberty Takings

The principles underpinning physical or regulatory takings case
law may form a basis for delineating the contours of liberty takings.
While claimants face a much higher standard to prove regulatory
takings than physical takings,227 the comprehensiveness of pretrial
detentionís deprivation of liberty could be framed as satisfying either
testís requirements. The question would be whether pretrial detention is
best conceptualized as a literal occupation/seizure of a person by the
state and therefore constitutes a physical taking.228 Alternatively,
pretrial detention could be framed as an all-encompassing regulation of
activity that effectively precludes all beneficial uses of the detaineeís
person and liberty and therefore constitutes a regulatory taking.229
Since liberty takings are designed to be a statutory cause of action, the
text of a statute establishing liberty takings can resolve any significant
uncertainty in the principles underpinning taking case law or in their
specific application to the taking of people.230
On its face the case for analogizing liberty takings to temporary
physical takings appears the most compelling. Pretrial detention
literally appears to be the seizure or occupation of an individual by the
state. The seizure of unconvicted individuals for weeks or months
should be as much or more of an affront to our sensibilities as the
seizure or occupation of physical property for equal or far greater
amounts of time, however necessary either takings may be to further a
public purpose.
The case could be made that the seizure of an individual prior to
conviction of a crime constitutes a physical taking both in the case of
individuals who are convicted and those who are never ultimately
convicted. However, one way to distinguish the physical takings of
those who are convicted of crimes would be to draw an analogy with the
longstanding practice of criminal forfeiture of private property that
facilitates criminal activity.231 By analogy one could reason that a
226
227

See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322.
See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (ìA ëtakingí may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by Government . . . than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.î).
228 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433-38 (1982).
229 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330.
230 See infra Part II.C.
231 See Fried, supra note 215, at 386 n.269 (discussing how criminal forfeiture functions).
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conviction means criminals forfeit their right to exercise the liberty that
facilitated criminal activity for the duration of the criminal sentence.
Therefore, no financial compensation would be needed in the case of
convicted defendants, and granting a set-off against sentences for time
served in detention would retroactively reflect the criminal conviction.
In contrast, the analogy with criminal forfeiture would break down in
the case of pretrial detention of individuals who are never convicted.
This ìpunishmentî is by definition inflicted irrespective of conviction,
and the nature and effects of the deprivation of liberty are far greater
than for the seizure of real or personal property.232 For this reason,
drawing the line for liberty takings at the issue of guilt is analogous to
the reasoning underpinning the criminal forfeiture of real and personal
property and offers a principled way of distinguishing when financial
compensation would be most appropriate.233
In contrast, the detention of an individual who is never convicted
of the alleged crime would clearly appear analogous to a physical
taking. By seizing and holding the individual, the state is asking her to
bear a burden of detention for the sake of the society.234 As a matter of
administrative necessity, a de minimis taking of an innocent defendant
for up to forty-eight hours of processing time for a bail hearing should
be non-compensable, even though following the spirit of physical
takings law might suggest the need for even de minimis
compensation.235 There are two ways to frame this issue consistently
with takings principles. One approach would be to analogize the
duration of a pre-bail hearing detention to a public necessity of a fire
truck or emergency vehicle occupying real property for the duration of
the emergency, which does not trigger the need for compensation under
the Takings Clause.236 Alternatively, time spent in detention prior to a
232 A logical extension of this Articleís argument for liberty takings could be that innocent
defendants should be compensated for the opportunity cost of the time that real or personal
property is held for civil or criminal forfeiture, if it is later returned following a failure to convict
or overturning of a conviction. The financial consequences of the seizure of property may be
immense and even irreversible for an individual or business. However, the economic burdens of
civil or criminal forfeiture pale in comparison to the myriad of burdens and disadvantages placed
on pretrial defendants by the deprivation of their liberty. Therefore, the case for compensation for
the temporary seizure of real or personal property is far less than that for liberty takings.
233 As this Article will discuss later, having liberty takings turn on the ultimate conviction of a
detainee for any of the underlying charges may overlook the fact that both the convictions and
their duration may reflect the disadvantages of detention as much or more than the actual guilt.
However, this narrow conception of liberty takings captures the most clear cases that merit
compensation and closely mirrors the distinction between criminal forfeiture and physical
takings. See infra Part II.B.3.
234 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
235 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1945) (establishing that
a complete occupation of property for even just one day necessitates compensation).
236 See Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 SW. U. L. REV. 627,
653-57 (1987-1988) (discussing cases in which courts have found that government actions were
justified by a ìpublic necessityî). This is analogous to the discussion in Loretto concerning the
application of a balancing test to temporary physical takings of limited scope and duration. The
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pre-bail hearing could be framed as a civic duty (much as it is already
is) to ensure that true flight risks and threats to the public do not escape
detection.237
While the analogy to physical takings appears the strongest, it is
also possible to frame pretrial detention as a form of regulatory takings.
It is admittedly counter-intuitive to conceive of pretrial detention as a
mere regulatory measure given the almost complete control the state
assumes over the detainee.238 However, pretrial detention could satisfy
the reasoning that underpins regulatory takings under either the
categorical regulatory takings test in Lucas, which requires the
deprivation of all beneficial economic use or value of property, or the
Penn Central balancing test that is applied to all lesser regulatory
burdens on property.239
The comprehensiveness of governmental control in pretrial
detention suggests that detainees are required ìto sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses [of their ability to exercise their liberty] in
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle.î240
As emphasized earlier, pretrial detention
imposes a complete deprivation of liberty and effectively forces
individuals to leave their productive potential idle for the detentionís
duration.241
However, the analogy between pretrial detention and categorical
regulatory takings faces two potential stumbling blocks: the question of
whether pretrial detention necessarily entails a total denial of any
economically beneficial use or value of oneís liberty and the temporary
nature of pretrial detention. As the pretrial detention of former Serbian
president Slobodan Milosevic admittedly demonstrates, individuals can
still appear productive in preparing their defense behind prison walls in
spite of the many disadvantages they face.242
The generous
accommodations of facilities and resources afforded to Milosevic while
in detention,243 however, are far different from the deprivations faced by
the typical pretrial detainee. A pretrial detainee generally lacks the
scope of the deprivation of liberty in the case of pretrial detention is not limited. However, the
duration of up to a forty-eight hour detention and its resulting costs are limited, and the rationale
for the pre-bail hearing detention is analogous to a public necessity. See Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978).
237 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 198, at 1096-97.
238 See infra Part II.A.2.
239 See Lucas v. S.C. Costal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019-20 (1992); Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 124.
240 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (emphasis in original); see also First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
241 See infra Part I.B.2.
242 See Marlise Simons, Milosevic Opens His Defense Case by Going on the Offensive, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at A7.
243 See The Lesson of Slobodan Milosevicís Trial and Tribulation, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003.
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means to be productive in any meaningful way during the duration of
her detention, and thus the deprivation of liberty appears
comprehensive. Pretrial detention is by definition limited in duration.
For this reason determining whether it constitutes a temporary
categorical regulatory taking may ìërequire[] careful examination and
weighing of all the relevant circumstancesíî of a detention to determine
eligibility for compensation.244 Here the nature and effects of the
deprivation of liberty and its comprehensiveness for the duration of the
detention make it appear analogous to a categorical regulatory taking.
But even assuming pretrial detention can be distinguished from a
categorical regulatory taking, a strong case would exist for finding a
regulatory taking under the Penn Central balancing test.245 In fact,
applying the balancing test approach offers a distinct advantage by
making it easier to justify the exclusion of an up to forty-eight hour
detention for bail processing from a liberty takings of longer duration.
For a detention of up to forty-eight hours or a marginally longer period,
there is a very strong government interest in holding detainees until a
bail hearing can be held to determine if they are a flight risk or pose a
threat to society, and to set the appropriate bail. While the deprivation
of liberty is still comprehensive,246 this holding period is analogous to a
public necessity of short duration,247 and the burden on the detainee
pales by comparison to the significance of the public interest at stake.
Additionally, the up to forty-eight hour detention of the individual may
be the only way to compile adequate information for a bail hearing and
thus to secure important government interests.
In contrast, for detentions beyond the de minimis threshold, the
case for compensation would be much stronger and would arguably
satisfy the Penn Central balancing test. The public benefits of detention
of a defendant may still exist after a reasonable time for a bail hearing to
be held. However, this interest would be less strong once the risk of
flight or threat to the public has been determined. At that time the
government would generally have recourse to less restrictive means
than detention to secure that interest. Additionally, the economic (and
as importantly, non-economic) impact of this occupation of the
individual by the state would likely appear so significant and
comprehensive for detentions above forty-eight hours that it would
outweigh the governmentís interests and mandate compensation.248

244 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regíl Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 335 (2002) (quoting Palazolla v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (OíConnor, J.,
concurring)).
245 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978).
246 Even the costs of up to a forty-eight hour detention are less, because the economic cost to
the detainee is likely to be modest and the long-run impact minimal.
247 See Karlin, supra note 236, at 653-57.
248 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
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4.

Distinguishing Liberty Takings From Partial Restraints On Liberty

As discussed above, the reasoning underpinning either physical or
regulatory takings can be used to delineate the contours of liberty
takings. By inference under either framework, any restraint placed on a
defendant that falls short of detention would appear to constitute a mere
restraint on liberty that need not be compensated. Given the significant
difference in the degree of deprivation of liberty between detention and
home arrest or electronic monitoring, these lesser burdens would not
approximate physical occupation by the state or tip the scales in a
balancing test away from regulatory takings.249
One counterargument to this approach would be the claim that
pretrial detention is designed not to be as onerous as imprisonment in
the general prison population. The Salerno Court gives some support to
this point by distinguishing between the regulatory purpose of pretrial
detention and the punitive purpose of formal imprisonment. The
Salerno Court noted that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires that
detainees ìbe housed in a ëfacility separate, to the extent practicable,
from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody
pending appeal.íî250 Detention centers may offer marginally less
restraint on the liberty of detainees and inflict lower potential costs on
them than imprisonment with long-term inmates. But separation of
defendants from the general prison population is not required, and in
fact the empirical evidence suggests that pretrial detainees face greater
deprivations than long-term inmates.251 Regardless of this point, the
comprehensive nature of the deprivation of liberty and its consequences
are substantially similar for both detainees and prisoners, and appear far
more onerous than the burdens imposed by lesser restraints on liberty.
Pretrial detention imposes a special set of harms. Detention not
only deprives individuals of their liberty and ability to work, but also
imposes costs that impair defendantsí effectiveness to defend
themselves and may inflict lasting emotional and psychological damage
249 This analogy is consistent with case law holding that home confinement is not tantamount
to pretrial detention and therefore does not qualify for sentencing set-offs under federal law. See,
e.g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 56-58 (1995) (holding that convicted felons may receive
sentencing credit for time served in pretrial detention only if they were held in a penal or
correctional facility subject to the control of the Bureau of Prisons); United States v. ReyesMercado, 22 F.3d 363, 367 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the fact that home confinement is
potentially a condition of probation, but not a substitute for imprisonment, indicates that Congress
did not consider home confinement tantamount to imprisonment); United States v. Phipps, 68
F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that home detention with electronic monitoring while
awaiting trial did not constitute pretrial detention for the purposes of a sentencing set-off because
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines differentiate between ìhome detentionî and ìimprisonmentî).
250 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1979) (citing 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(i)(2)).
251 See Franklin & Peters, supra note 55, at 1092-93.
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on innocent detainees, their families, and their communities.252 In
contrast, home detention or electronic monitoring may inflict only some
of these costs. Even in the most extreme case of detention at home
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, the defendant still enjoys
liberty and the ability to engage in productive activities to a
dramatically greater degree than a detainee who is subjected to direct
control by the state in a detention facility. Individuals may still suffer a
significant reputational cost from being confined to their home or being
subjected to electronic monitoring. Individuals may suffer a significant
economic cost as well if they are cut off from their work (although
home detentions may allow individuals a reasonable period of day-time
freedom to pursue employment).253 Even assuming that individuals
may be cut off from their current jobs, individuals detained at home are
not necessarily cut off from other forms of home-based income
producing activities. All of these costs appear objectively far less than
those imposed by pretrial detention.
Most significantly, defendants under home detention or lesser
restraints must not suffer the deprivations that formal detention inflicts.
Cabin fever may impose its own set of costs, but these do not compare
to the psychological, emotional, and even physical effects of formal
detention or imprisonment.254 Individuals subject to home detention can
enjoy all of the comforts of home and are not cut off from their friends
and family. They are not subject to the indignities of life behind bars
and must not live in fear of physical brutality and anomie from the loss
of all autonomy. Home detainees will also have all of the time in the
world to meet with their legal counsel and to plan their case.
For all of these reasons restraints that fall short of formal pretrial
detention arguably result in only a partial deprivation of liberty and do
not approximate a physical taking or satisfy the Penn Central balancing
test for regulatory takings. This approach advances one of the
underlying objectives of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The Act called
for judges to adopt the least restrictive means to secure the stateís
objectives of securing the presence of the defendant at trial and
preventing further harms to the community while the defendant is out
on bail.255 Recognition of a compensable taking only in cases of pretrial
detention would thus provide the state with financial incentives to abide
by this largely overlooked objective and encourage the use of less
restrictive means than pretrial detention to safeguard state interests.256
252
253

See infra Part I.B.2.
See Charles Strum, Fearing Felons on the Loose, New Jersey Reviews Monitoring, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 1992, ß 1, at 31.
254 See infra Section I.B.2.
255 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(c), (e).
256 Placing a financial sanction on the state as a whole will not necessarily deter individual
actors, a topic that will be discussed in Part II.C.4.
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This approach could admittedly have some perverse effects in
denying compensation to individuals subjected to conditions that fall
just short of pretrial detention.
For example, court-mandated
confinement in a community treatment center prior to trial represents a
hard case in between pretrial detention and home detention, which could
fall between the cracks of an analogy to physical or regulatory
takings.257 Community treatment centers have many facets similar to
detention centers in restrictions on liberty and the ability to work.
However, the detaineeís choice to participate in this rehabilitative
program rather than to be placed in a pretrial detention center makes this
case appear to fall outside of a personal taking.
While the reasoning that underpins physical or regulatory takings
case law could form a framework for liberty takings, the fact that liberty
takings would be a statutory cause of action offers some significant
advantages. A liberty takings statute could codify the principal
distinctions of takings law rather than attempt to fully incorporate
existing takings doctrine. In this way a statute could clarify any
ambiguities in existing takings doctrine or difficulties in applying these
principles to the taking of people. Legislatures would understandably
want to delineate these limits, rather than to delegate to courts broad
discretion to define when liberty takings occur. Legislatures could also
streamline the adjudication process to minimize administrative expenses
and increase certainty both for the state and affected individuals
concerning when and what form of compensation would apply. This
could make liberty takings both more viable to implement and more
politically palatable. The following section will explore the potential
mechanics of implementing compensation for liberty takings and lay out
some of the potential implications that could result from this plan.

B.

Conditions for Compensation

1.

The Standard for Compensation

Two significant concerns remain for defining the parameters of
liberty takings: determining what standards for compensation should be
adopted and what classes of detainees should be eligible for
compensation. As discussed earlier, states and the federal government
need a de minimis window of up to forty-eight hours for administrative
purposes to prepare for a bail hearing.258 This period should be
257 In Reno v. Koray, the Supreme Court rejected a due process claim by a pretrial detainee
who objected to the fact that his time spent in a community drug treatment center was not set off
against his ultimate sentence under 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b); see Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64-65
(1995).
258 See supra Part II.A.3.
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excluded from any taking calculation, and the trigger event for
compensation should be the conclusion of the bail hearing. At this point
it would be reasonable for the clock for compensation to begin ticking if
a liberty taking is later found to apply.
The standard of compensation for physical or regulatory takings of
real property is generally based on the fair market value of the property
at the time of the taking.259 In the case of a temporary taking,
compensation would reflect the value of a leasehold over real property
for the duration of the taking.260 While it may be easy to compare the
value of houses in a given neighborhood, it is more difficult to measure
the value of individual liberty. The closest analogue is the opportunity
cost of pretrial detention for the defendant. An opportunity cost
approach would seek to estimate the ìrentî that one would receive from
selling oneís labor. While the simplest way to approximate opportunity
cost would be to determine lost wages or to assess earning power, this
opportunity cost would admittedly only capture a significant percentage
of the value placed on the lost liberty. This approach obviously would
not capture the full endowment effect that an owner attributes to
withholding her labor from labor markets or using her liberty according
to her own wishes.261
Nonetheless, an individualized assessment approach has
tremendous appeal. A judge or magistrate could take into account the
opportunity cost of pre-trial detention for a given individual. Relying
solely or primarily on a benchmark for opportunity cost, such as
foregone wages, would be relatively easy to administer and to confirm
in most cases. At the same time, an opportunity cost standard would
mean the cost of a given personís detention would depend primarily on
her vocation. This point has troubling implications as the detention of
poor people could be virtually costless compared to the detention of
more affluent people. This danger can be mitigated by imposing a cap
and floor on opportunity cost based compensation, an approach this
section will subsequently explore.
A judge could also potentially consider the larger context of costs
that detention inflicts. For example, awards could include additional
compensation to offset the effects of separation from family or the
indignities of detention. This practice could be similar to the practice of
paying market value plus a modest premium percentage to compensate
for the personal value that a particular owner places on owning her
259 See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934) (holding that the standard for fair
market value is ìthe amount that in all probability would have been arrived at by fair negotiations
between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser desiring to buyî).
260 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regíl Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 322 (2002).
261 For a discussion of the endowment effect premium that an owner attributes to her property,
see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1483 (1998).
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parcel of land.262 In this case different individuals would have different
degrees of emotional distress inflicted because of how the impact of
detention could vary by individual. Giving a judge some leeway to take
this factor into account would allow compensation to reflect the real
costs of pretrial detention more comprehensively. Alternatively, the
award of a fixed premium or percentage could recognize these
additional costs, yet minimize the need for judges to make subjective
decisions about the emotional impact of detention in a given case.
The problems with an individualized assessment of opportunity
cost and potentially other non-economic costs are twofold. First, these
hearings could put a large strain on state resources. This point would be
especially true if these determinations went beyond the opportunity cost
of employment to more subjective questions of the impact of detention
on the former detainee. Concerns for judicial economy may require a
focus on the question of the economic opportunity cost of detention,
even though this approach may result in the systematic underestimation
of the true costs of detention. Judges would value reliance on easily
confirmable proxies, such as foregone earnings, because of the need to
minimize the burden liberty takings cases would place on their dockets.
By limiting proceedings to economic costs inflicted by detention, this
approach might be more palatable to legislatures who would wish to
minimize administrative costs.
The second concern is the class and economic bias that would
likely result from an opportunity cost standard. White-collar criminal
defendants already have great advantages in the criminal justice process,
if only because of their greater financial ability to meet bail and to
secure skilled counsel able to enforce their rights zealously.263 They are
already disproportionately represented in the percentage of cases that go
to trial because they have the means to meet bail and to exploit every
advantage that defendants hold in the criminal justice system.264
Individualized assessments would enhance the advantages that whitecollar criminal defendants enjoy. Courts would be more reluctant to
detain white-collar criminal defendants because of the need to
compensate them for their high opportunity costs of detention if they are
acquitted. In contrast, the same people who are guilty of being too poor
to make bail would also likely have a low opportunity cost for
imprisonment and a lower likelihood of retaining zealous advocates to
secure their acquittal and subsequent compensation.265
262 Paying a premium for the takings was a traditional English practice that is still used in
Canada and many other Commonwealth countries. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note
23, at 139-40.
263 See William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1714-15
(1993).
264 See id. at 1715.
265 See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shall Not be Compelled to Render
the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 364-65 (1993).
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For this reason, a flat per diem standard of compensation might
seem more appropriate both to satisfy concerns about fairness and to
minimize administrative costs.266 In theory, pretrial detention or
imprisonment partly serves as a means of saying that all people are
equal before the law. Treating all detainees the same in terms of
compensation regardless of the opportunity costs or other factors might
reinforce this message.267 But a per diem standard could also end up
defeating the purpose of liberty takings by serving as symbolic but
nominal compensation that does not approximate the costs pretrial
detention inflicts on the individual.
The solution to reconcile these competing concerns would be to
create a hybrid system that gives courts flexibility to use individual
opportunity cost to determine appropriate compensation between a per
diem floor and cap. The floor of per diem compensation would be
designed to ensure that the most economically disadvantaged detainees
with low opportunities costs receive reasonable compensation for the
costs inflicted by their detention. The cap would be designed to ensure
a measure of class equity, so that a high opportunity cost person would
not automatically be exempted from pretrial detention because of
concerns of potentially paying their opportunity cost of detention down
the line. By employing an opportunity cost system between the cap and
floor, courts would be empowered to seek compensation that more
accurately reflects the particular costs that individuals were forced to
bear in detention.
The difficulty would be establishing what per diem rate would be
appropriate for a cap and floor. A per diem floor should be designed
with the goal of creating a credible incentive for the state to use less
restrictive means than pretrial detention. At the same time, there is a
danger of a moral hazard if the compensation levels for a per diem floor
are too high. It may be hard to imagine that individuals would eagerly
seek to ìcome to the takingsî and voluntarily subject themselves to the
deprivation of their liberty for the sake of liberty takings
compensation.268 But generosity in compensating those subjected to
pretrial detention should be tempered by considerations of not wanting
to create an incentive for coming to the liberty taking or embroiling the
state in litigation on this point. This issue is all the more significant as
266 See Michael King, Bail Reform: The Working Party and the Ideal Bail System, 1974 CRIM.
L. REV. 451, 452-53 (calling for the compensation of acquitted pretrial detainees based on a
system of fixed per diem compensation).
267 This approach would be analogous to the uniform per diem compensation for jury duty.
But jury duty offers only a limited comparison as jury duty compensation is generally nominal
and can be as low as $10 per day. See Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury COLA: Fulfilling the
Duty to Compensate Jurors Adequately, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. P OLíY 289, 315, 339 (2002).
268 See Henry A. Span, Public Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause,
40 IDAHO L. REV. 11, 100-02 (2003) (discussing the ìcoming to the takingsî problem in the
context of regulatory takings).
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perceptions of excessive generosity could be politicized to attack the
legitimacy of either a legislative program or judicial determinations of
liberty takings. On the other extreme, the cap should at least reflect the
economic costs that middle class Americans would face, so that judges
would have flexibility to make average Americans as close as possible
to whole again financially.
2.

The Narrow Conception of Liberty Takings

Having established the contours of a framework for compensation,
the question remains of what categories of detainees merit
compensation. The following two sections will make the case first for a
narrow conception of liberty takings and then for a broader view that
seeks to take into account how guilty pleas for nominal charges may
mask the coercive power of pretrial detention.
The narrow conception of liberty takings would closely follow the
reasoning of physical and regulatory takings.269 While any pretrial
detention may technically constitute a form of taking by the state, this
approach would draw the line of eligibility for financial compensation
on the question of whether the state ultimately secured a guilty plea or
conviction for one of the charges underpinning the pretrial detention. A
single guilty plea or conviction would vindicate the pretrial detention
decision. Offsetting time served against the ultimate sentence would
serve as full compensation for the duration of the detention, which is the
existing practice followed by the federal government and many states.270
In contrast, individuals who are never convicted of the crimes
underpinning the detention would be eligible for financial compensation
under a cause of action for liberty takings.
As noted earlier, this view would accord with the distinction
between recognizing compensable physical takings when the state
seizes property in the absence of a criminal act and the noncompensable forfeiture of property that is involved in or acquired
through specific types of criminal activity.271 Alternatively, one could
analogize this to the distinction between compensable regulatory takings
that deny all of an ownerís economically beneficial use of property with
non-compensable bans on using property for specific illegal purposes.
The virtue of this approach is that the determination of a personal
taking would be very straightforward and easy to administer. The
occurrence of pretrial detention would be an uncontested fact as would
be the implications of verdicts of not guilty, a decision to rescind all
269
270
271

See supra Section II.A.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b).
See supra Part II.A.3.
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charges, or an admission of guilt or conviction. This could potentially
make the process of determining and enforcing liberty takings impose a
low burden on courts. Limiting financial compensation only to those
not convicted of any charges also provides the strongest platform for
appealing to the sense of fairness of the general public and politicians in
advocating the enactment of liberty takings.
Some former detainees would presumably be eligible for both
liberty takings claims and for Section 1983 actions or torts for wrongful
arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.272 The wrong
inflicted by pretrial detention in these cases would generally be
derivative of these other claims. Therefore, claimants should be able to
collect compensation for either one or more of these actions or for
liberty takings, but not both. Since such detainees would already have
adequate redress for the deprivations they have suffered, this provision
would seek to prevent them from gaining a windfall through a liberty
taking claim.
Although the narrow view of liberty takings would make defining
eligibility for liberty takings fairly simple, its criteria would still create
problems in some cases, such as a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity. In these instances a judge or jury confirms that the defendant
committed the criminal act(s), but the defendant lacked the requisite
mens rea because of a mental condition.273 Two main questions arise.
First, should a court recognize a liberty takings for the pretrial detention
of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity? Second, should
those found not guilty by reason of insanity be eligible for a personal
taking if they are confined to a mental health facility after trial? The
answer to both questions is likely that no liberty takings would occur.
The Supreme Court in Foucha v. Louisiana argued that those not guilty
by reason of insanity ìhave not been convicted of crimes, neither have
they been exonerated.î274 This insight captures the point that the
presumption of innocence that comes with a ìnot guiltyî verdict or even
the exercise of prosecutorial decision to rescind charges is
fundamentally different from the case of a holding of not guilty by
reason of insanity. In the cases of exculpation by reason of insanity, the
verdict itself confirms that the underlying act was committed and that
there may exist an ongoing threat to the public to justify uncompensated
institutionalization in a mental health facility.275
While
institutionalization in a mental health facility may impose many of the
same burdens as pretrial detention, these burdens are less and the
underlying goals of the institutionalization are different in seeking to
272
273

See Bernhard, supra note 19, at 86-93.
See Christopher Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith: The Constitutional Contours of the Forensic
Evaluation, 31 EMORY L.J. 71, 82 n.48-49 (1982).
274 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 121 (1992).
275 See Slobogin, supra note 273, at 108.
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remedy the effects of mental illness. This analysis could also apply to
justify the uncompensated confinement of sexual predators in mental
health facilities following the end of their criminal sentences.276
3.

The Case for a Broader Conception of Liberty Takings

Allowing a single guilty plea to vindicate pretrial detention
decisions has many advantages. But the shortcoming of the narrow
view of liberty takings is that it overlooks one of the primary problems
caused by pretrial detention: the tremendous incentives that detainees
face to plead guilty in spite of their innocence.277 The leverage of
prosecutors and hardships of pretrial detention mean that innocent
detainees who can withstand these pressures and not cop a token plea to
get out of jail may be few and far between.278 The fact that the
overwhelming majority of cases are resolved by plea bargain may
reflect the effective screening of prosecutors.279 Much more likely it
underscores the incentives of any accused party, and especially those in
pretrial detention, to agree to a plea bargain to end or minimize their
hardship.
The contrasting experiences of alleged nuclear secrets spy Wen Ho
Lee and acquitted murder suspect and former football star O.J. Simpson
highlights the need for a broader conception of liberty takings to
account for cases in which a token conviction or plea bargain would
never have justified the detention in the first place. The most visible
abuse of pretrial detention is the story of how heavy-handed tactics by
the FBI led to the nine-month detention of alleged nuclear secrets spy
Wen Ho Lee.280 Lee was detained without bail because the government
alleged fifty-nine counts related to espionage. In the end the
government settled for a guilty plea on a single minor count and a
sentence of time served, an outcome that was almost universally
acknowledged as a travesty for the FBI.281 Wen Ho Lee would not have
been imprisoned but for the extreme number of largely unfounded
allegations levied against him, and he would never have been detained
without bail for the single count to which he pled guilty.282 Leeís career
276
277
278
279

See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1993).
See Clarke & Kurtz, supra note 129, at 502-05; Goldkamp, supra note 129, at 245.
See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2492.
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS 95 tbl. D-4 (2001).
280 See David Johnston, From the First, A Feud Between the Justice Dept. and the F.B.I., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at A29.
281 For an overview of the Wen Ho Lee affair and the FBIís litany of errors, see DAN STOIBER
& IAN HOFFMAN, A CONVENIENT SPY : WEN HO LEE AND THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR
ESPIONAGE (2001); WEN HO LEE, MY COUNTRY VERSUS ME (2001).
282 See Mathew Purdy, The Prosecution Unravels: The Case of Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
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was ruined, his name disgraced, and he bore the scars of months of
detention. Nonetheless, under the narrow view of liberty takings, Leeís
guilty plea would vindicate the governmentís detention decision to
detain him and leave no possibility for financial compensation.283
In contrast, the equally high profile case of O.J. Simpson would
lead to a different set of results and a requirement to compensate. O.J.
Simpson was detained for almost one year before and during the course
of his murder trial that led to his acquittal on all charges.284 Under a
narrow conception of liberty takings O.J. Simpson would receive
compensation because he was found ìnot guilty,î regardless of the
likelihood of jury nullification at his trial.285 The irony of these two
outcomes is that a large consensus exists that Wen Ho Lee was a victim
of the criminal justice system, while even apologists for O.J. Simpson
may have a hard time claiming his complete innocence with a straight
face. The successful $33 million civil suit against O.J. Simpson would
mean that any compensation for pretrial detention would likely go to the
heirs of his alleged victims.286 This fact means this particular outcome
of compensation would likely enjoy popular acceptance, but there may
be many other cases in which popular opinion might perceive
compensation as unjust.
The desire to compensate innocent individuals who have been
subjected to pretrial detention may require erring on the side of overinclusiveness. At first glance placing the burden on former detainees to
prove their actual innocence for liberty takings claims might appear
attractive.287 But requiring plaintiffs to establish actual innocence and
courts to verify these claims would be difficult, time consuming, and
costly, and courts rarely even attempt to address this question.288 For
5, 2001, at A1.
283 Wen Ho Lee is currently suing the U.S. government for leaks of private information to the
press, but this lawsuit is unrelated to his pretrial detention. See Jacques Steinberg, Times
Reporters to Be Deposed in Scientistís Case Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at A41.
284 See Charlie LeDuff, A Celebrity Home Thatís Not on the Star Maps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2002, at A12.
285 See POSTMORTEM : THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE 1, 15-18 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996).
286 See Simpson Fights Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2002, at A15 (noting that O.J. Simpson
has only paid a few hundred thousand dollars of the $33.5 million he owes from the wrongful
death civil suit).
287 A few countries, such as Denmark and Norway, have placed the burden on the former
detainee to prove her innocence as a condition for claims of compensation. See Hans
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Compensation for Unjustified Imprisonment in Danish Law, 18
SCANDANVIAN STUD. L. 29, 32 (1974). In contrast, former pretrial detainees who are never
convicted are eligible for compensation under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, and domestic law in several European states, such as Germany and the Netherlands.
See Carolyn Shelbourn, Compensation for Detention, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 22, 25 (1978); Adam
Tomkins, Civil Liberties in the Council of Europe: A Critical Survey, in EUROPEAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 19 (Conor A. Gearty ed., 1997).
288 See Givelber, supra note 35, at 1322-23.
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the sake of limiting the costs of administration of liberty takings claims,
the O.J. Simpsons of the world should receive compensation regardless
of how the courts of popular opinion have resolved their guilt.
Cases, such as Wen Ho Leeís, underscore the more troubling issue
that the government may have tremendous leverage to extract guilty
pleas from those whom it holds in pretrial detention. In the case of Wen
Ho Lee, the failures of the governmentís case were manifest, but the
government used the quid pro quo of Leeís freedom to extract the face
saving guilty plea. One might imagine Wen Ho Leeís incentives to
plead guilty to any charge would be different if he had the prospect of
compensation for the time he was subject to pretrial detention if he held
out and was found not guilty. At the same time, an innocent person in
prison would likely value their freedom much more than waiting in
detention longer for the sake of a speculative prospect of future
compensation. If compensation were relatively low, this point might be
especially true for a man with a high earning potential, such as a
scientist like Lee.289
The prosecution not only has the carrot of letting a detainee out of
prison to secure a plea bargain, but also has the more implicit additional
sticks of retaliating against the defendant in the present or future cases.
This fact means that irritating prosecutors by not copping a plea could
lead to further charges, a longer detention, a higher probability of
eventual conviction, or even charges against friends and loved ones.290
In contrast, cooperation with the prosecution might lead to a
compromise that empties the prosecutorís desk of the file and allows the
former detainee to put the painful experience of detention behind her.
To overcome these stark incentives, a broader conception of liberty
takings would allow former detainees to file for compensation when the
eventual guilty plea or conviction could not reasonably have justified
the pretrial detention decision. This broader view would create a
rebuttable presumption against financial compensation in the cases of a
conviction or guilty plea. Former detainees would have the burden to
show that the detention would not have been reasonable had prosecutors
only raised the charge(s) for which the detainee was convicted.
Wen Ho Leeís experience would be an easy case to establish a
financial claim for liberty takings given how fifty-nine charges were
reduced to one nominal plea and his release for time served. It would
be more difficult to distinguish closer cases. For example, the
prosecution may have good faith reasons to seek the pretrial detention
of a suspect and a court may simply convict on lesser charges, or other
289 Depending upon the guilty pleaís ramification for his professional career, this point might
not be true. But one would imagine that high earners would have greater incentives to plead
guilty to get out of pretrial detention than lower earners for whom the potential compensation
would represent a higher percentage of their prospective earnings.
290 See Christopher, supra note 132, at 108-09.
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priorities on prosecutorsí dockets may lead to a plea bargain that was
generous to the defendant. The legitimate concern could be raised that
we would not want to minimize incentives for generosity towards
defendants simply because of the specter of liberty takings
compensation.
This broader conception of liberty takings would also be more
administratively cumbersome and significantly more expensive to the
state. The more narrow conception of liberty takings could easily
resolve the issue of financial liability and would allow courts to focus
solely on the question of the appropriate compensation for those not
convicted of any crime. In contrast, determining whether a conviction
or guilty plea reasonably justified the detention could consume far more
judicial resources. In addition, detainees who were found not guilty or
against whom charges were dropped form a small percentage of cases
compared to those convicted or pleading guilty to at least some portion
of the alleged offenses.291 Allowing suits in these latter instances could
amount to little more than an employment act for the plaintiffís bar by
opening up the possibility of literally millions of lawsuits against federal
and state governments.292
While expanding liberty takings to
encompass these claims would dramatically expand the pool of potential
liberty takings claimants, the rebuttable presumption against such a
claim in the case of a conviction or plea bargain is designed to stem the
floodgates of litigation and to limit claims to clear abuses of pretrial
detention.
While these caveats are significant, liberty takings may have no
teeth if all it takes is a guilty plea on a single count to void the financial
claim, regardless of the duration of the detention and the heavyhandedness of the prosecution. Currently, prosecutors seek token plea
bargains when their cases turn out to be weaker than anticipated to
preserve their reputations and vindicate the decision to prosecute by
securing a conviction.293 But if a single conviction or plea would
291 It is difficult even to find statistics on the frequency of guilty pleas in exchange for reduced
charges, so it is hard to estimate what percentage of defendants would be eligible for this broader
view of takings. See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 73 n.167. Given that ninety-five percent
of those convicted plead guilty, the potential pool of claimants is a substantial one although
limited by placing the burden on claimants to show that the detention would not have been
reasonable if the only charges raised were those for which they were convicted.
292 See Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers
and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST. JOHNíS L. REV. 229, 230 (1990) (arguing how the expansion of
rights for the disabled may end up making lawyers the biggest beneficiaries through attorneyís
fees for litigation to enforce the rights).
293 Plea bargains allow prosecutors to avoid the risk of failure (and its political/reputational
costs). See George Fisher, Plea Bargainingís Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 867-68 (2000); see
also FISHER, supra note 89, at 223-29. Ironically, plea bargains can be used to reinforce the
reputation of the system as a whole. The existence of a plea bargain in theory at least removes
the danger of factual or legal error, because a party who cops a plea is unlikely to challenge that
plea at a later date. Fisher, supra, at 867-68.
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inoculate the state from liberty takings liability, this could simply serve
as another incentive for prosecutors to keep detainees on ice until they
break down and cop a plea. If a detainee could still gain financial
compensation in spite of a token plea, prosecutors would be less able to
undermine the purpose of a cause of action for liberty takings. Because
plea bargains have become so central to an overburdened criminal
justice system,294 allowing detainees to plea without waiving their right
to compensation may help to level the playing field for defendants
without providing significant incentives for them not to bargain at all
with prosecutors.
A related question is whether compensation should stop at only
those detained or rather should extend to individuals who post bail yet
are never convicted of any crime. The argument would be that at
minimum defendants lose the opportunity cost of the money they post
for bail. More significantly, poor defendants often have to go through
bail bondsmen to secure their bail, who often charge large nonrefundable fees for posting bail.295 The economic harm caused by
posting bail may be significant and may constitute an uncompensated
burden placed on innocent defendants for the benefit of society.
However, this monetary impact pales in comparison to the potential
myriad of harms inflicted by pretrial detention, and the fact that no
deprivation of liberty is involved means it would fall short of liberty
takings.296
294 The criminal justice systemís reliance on plea bargaining is in large part a product of both
the rising number of civil cases and the spiraling time and financial costs of jury trials. See John
H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOCíY REV. 261,
262 (1979). While the criminal justice systemís reliance on plea bargaining grew into the vast
majority of cases last century, it has become the unquestioned centerpiece of the criminal justice
system since the Supreme Court affirmed plea bargainingís constitutionality in Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
295 For example, in Connecticut, state law allows bail bondsmen to charge up to a ten percent
fee for the first $5,000 of bail and then up to a seven percent fee for bail above that amount. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ß 29-151 (West 2000). This amount may seem small, but to indigents
and their families such non-refundable costs may have a significant impact on their lives.
296 It is outside the scope of this work, but the financial burden inflicted in posting bail could
be mitigated by offering some form of interest on bail, such as the interest given for
overpayments on federal taxes, to offset the opportunity cost of money. Alternatively, the state
could offer full compensation to innocent detainees or sidestep private bonds-bailsmen by
creating publicly-financed bond programs modeled after existing deposit bond programs (in
which the defendants post a percentage of the bond with the court). See, e.g., MICHAEL D.
KANNENSOHN & DICK HOWARD, BAIL BOND REFORM IN KENTUCKY AND OREGON 5-14 (1978)
(detailing how Kentucky and Oregon have prohibited private bail bondsmen and created deposit
bond systems). But see Halland & Tabarrok, supra note 60, at 97-98 (arguing how bail bondsmen
are highly effective as private enforcers in monitoring defendants out on bail and securing their
appearance at trial or their recapture after flight). This same logic applies to the question of
whether a defendant should receive compensation for the opportunity cost of real or personal
property seized and later released by the police following a failure to convict or an overturning of
a conviction. The temporary seizure of real or personal property could be framed as the
functional equivalent of cash bail, which may impose significant economic costs, yet is a far less
significant burden on defendants than the deprivation of liberty. See supra text accompanying
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C.

The Questions of Political Viability and Degree of Deterrence

This Article has suggested how a cause of action for liberty takings
could go far towards compensating pretrial detainees for the burden that
they bear for the sake of society. Crucial questions remain concerning
the ability to contain the costs of administration, the incentive effects for
state actors and defendants, and the political obstacles to enactment.
1.

Containing the Costs of Liberty Takings

The biggest obstacles to this proposal are likely not to be
principled objections, but rather pragmatic concerns about the costs
involved and the incentive effects for state actors.297 Liberty takings
would entail new costs and pose dangers of perverse or unintended
consequences that may come from changing a single facet of the
criminal justice system. This section will show how the administration
costs can be contained to manageable levels. While the proposal may
admittedly have some perverse effects on the incentives of prosecutors,
it will show how the existence of liberty takings may produce incentives
for greater prosecutorial screening and a reduction in the stateís reliance
on pretrial detention.
Under the current system, criminal justice costs largely fall into
three categories: pretrial costs, plea bargaining and/or trial costs, and the
costs of pretrial detention and imprisonment.298 First, there are costs for
note 232.
297 Numerous commentators have objected to the potential ìcommodificationî of
constitutional rights and the danger that this approach may perversely encourage state actors to
regard rights violations as mere transaction costs for governmental activities. See, e.g., AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE : FIRST PRINCIPLES 115 & n.112
(1997) (arguing against the use of liability rules for constitutional rights on these grounds);
Coleman & Kraus, supra note 9, at 1338-40 (asserting the incompatibility of constitutional rights
with liability rules). But see Kontorovich, supra note 9, at 771-79, 811-13 (arguing that concerns
over commodification of rights are overstated and showing how constitutional rights can be
adequately protected by liability rules, at least under extraordinary circumstances). However, the
issue of commodification of rights appears to be of little concern in the context of pretrial
detention. First, almost all commentators acknowledge that pretrial detention is a necessary evil
in at least some cases and that the existence of probable cause of committing an offense,
combined with other bail factors, may legitimize the pretrial detention decision and not infringe
on other rights. Second, an incomplete system of compensation for pretrial detainees already
exists. The federal government and most states compensate convicted individuals for time served
in pretrial detention by offsetting this period against the ultimate sentence. Former pretrial
detainees are eligible for causes of action in the case of egregious abuses by state actors. For
these reasons this proposal is about filling the gaps of compensation in this existing system, and
concerns with this proposal will likely not center on issues of principle, but rather on whether the
costs and incentive effects of liberty takings would justify broadening the scope of eligibility for
and the extent of compensation.
298 The stateís costs include a range of police, prosecutorial, and judicial resources, but this
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state actors to detect crime, to locate and arrest defendants, to compile
and assess evidence to establish probable cause of particular offenses,
and to make bail decisions. Second, prosecutors must employ time and
resources to prove defendantsí guilt through trial (and consume judicial
resources in the process) or more commonly produce only the evidence
necessary to secure plea bargains.299 Third, the state incurs substantial
costs to house detained individuals prior to trial and to incarcerate them
following convictions.
Liberty takings would impose three new types of costs: the costs of
administration, adjudication, and payment for liberty takings; the costs
incurred from defendantsí and prosecutorsí adjustments to changed
incentives in charging, bail hearing, and plea bargaining processes; and
costs from state and/or prosecutorial efforts to reduce exposure to
liberty taking claims, such as through greater prosecutorial screening.
These economic and non-economic costs would impose burdens on
state actors during the pretrial and trial or plea bargaining stages.
However, enacting liberty takings may ultimately make the criminal
justice system more cost-effective by providing incentives to enhance
prosecutorial screening and to reduce the number of cases in which
innocent people are subjected to pretrial detention and convictions.
This result may ultimately decrease the stateís reliance on and extensive
spending for pretrial detention and imprisonment.300
The issue of administrative costs looms large in defending the
proposalís viability.301 The state would incur costs to administer and
adjudicate liberty takings claims, as well as to pay for actual liberty
takings judgments. For this reason, the narrow conception of liberty
takings appears to be the most appealing. Under this framework, liberty
takings eligibility would turn on the lack of any conviction to justify
retroactively the pretrial detention. The only issue for judges or other
administrative officials to determine would be the opportunity cost of
detention using wages as the proxy, which would be bounded by a cap
and floor on damages. This analysis could be simply and swiftly
resolved by requiring written documentation and confirmation of the

brief review of costs provides a baseline for considering how costs would change following the
enactment of liberty takings.
299 As discussed earlier, the criminal justice systemís reliance on plea bargaining reduces
much of the costs of proving guilt by reducing the need for trial and allowing police and
prosecutors to spend less time building their case before securing a conviction. See Standen,
supra note 89, at 1505-17; Miller, supra note 89, at 1253.
300 These savings could be quite substantial given the fact that federal and state costs per
prisoner range from $30,000 to $50,000 per year. See McShane, supra note 144, at 134-35.
301 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 8, at 1214-19 (arguing that transaction costs should be
among the primary considerations in delineating takings claims); Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 9, at 1093-97 (framing transaction costs and administrative costs as key criteria in
determining whether to rely on a liability rule to protect a right or interest).
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former detaineeís salary or the application of a standard default of a
compensation floor.
In contrast, a broader conception of liberty takings could be more
taxing to prosecutorial and judicial resources. Use of this framework
would expand the number of potential claims and focus the inquiry on
the more contentious and difficult issue of whether the ultimate
conviction could have reasonably justified the pretrial detention
decision. Imposing strict limits on oral argument concerning this issue
and/or limiting debate to written submissions could go far towards
cabining these costs. Eliminating or limiting grounds or avenues of
appeal could also help to minimize costs.
Another key element would be to ensure access for prospective
plaintiffs yet to contain legal costs. Indigents generally have no right to
counsel for civil damage claims.302 Allowing contingent fees could
ensure access, but could also lead to lawyersí consuming much of the
liberty takings proceeds. This outcome would not reduce the deterrent
effect of liberty takings on state actors, but may significantly undermine
the goal of compensating detainees, unless lawyersí fees came on top of
liberty takings payouts.303 The solution may be to implement a fixed
fee compensation system or to impose a low cap on compensable hours
of work performed by lawyers of successful litigants in order to ensure
legal access but to attempt to contain the costs.304 The costs of
administering and paying liberty takings claims may admittedly be
significant depending on how high the floor for compensation is set.
However, the costs of pretrial detention and incarceration are also high,
and a reduced reliance on pretrial detention could go far towards
offsetting these costs.
Assuming the costs of administration for a broad conception of
liberty takings can be contained to politically palatable levels, critics
may still oppose this proposal for siphoning off badly needed funds
away from securing adequate representation for defendants or other
equally worthy purposes.305 The ideal system would ensure that all
302
303

See Lassiter v. Depít of Soc. Servs. of Durham, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).
If the Equal Access to Justice Act applies to the proposal, then the federal government
would be liable for attorneysí fees for successful litigants, which would be above and beyond any
liberty takings compensation. See 28 U.S.C. ß 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000).
304 This approach could create similar incentives to those that public defenders face in plea
bargaining and encourage lawyers to settle liberty takings as quickly as possible at a discount for
the state. This result could partly frustrate the goal of compensating former detainees, but
attempts to make the conditions for liberty claims as formulaic and simple to determine as
possible will hopefully mitigate this concern. However, the fixed fee approach would give
incentives to plaintiffsí lawyers to minimize the administrative costs of liberty takings settlements
or proceedings.
305 Resources allocated to greater screening of prospective defendants and the costs of
defending against, adjudicating, and paying off liberty takings claims must come at the expense
of other legislative and prosecutorial priorities. Efforts to defend the indigent and to vindicate the
wrongfully convicted are already significantly underfunded both at the federal and state level, and
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defendants have adequate legal representation. But the reality is that
both literal indigents and individuals of modest means receive inferior
legal services that place these defendants at a significant disadvantage
vis-‡-vis prosecutors in bail hearing and plea bargaining processes.306
Liberty takings is not designed as a holistic solution to the
problems posed by inadequate legal representation. Instead, liberty
takings aspires only to address one of the worst areas for abuse that
results from the lack of a level playing field for defendants. The costs
of liberty takings may even exceed the costs of financing more effective
counsel in the case of valid claims. But valid liberty takings claims
would likely constitute only a small percentage of criminal cases once
prosecutors adjust to the new incentives created by liberty takings.307
As the following section will discuss, the potential incentive effects of
liberty takings are as or more important than actual compensation in
seeking to foster greater prosecutorial screening of cases and greater
proportionality between charges and convictions.
2.

Assessing the Incentive Effects of Liberty Takings

The incentive effects of liberty takings entail costs and risks of
some perverse consequences. However, the benefits from incentives for
heightened prosecutorial screening and a reduced reliance on pretrial
detention arguably outweigh these costs. The section will address
concerns about potential tradeoffs from liberty takings in marginal cases
of questionable guilt and assess liberty takingsí impact on plea
bargaining processes. It will acknowledge that liberty takings may
result in seemingly perverse effects for some pretrial detainees, but
suggest how these outcomes are likely to be consistent with greater
prosecutorial screening. It will show how liberty takings can be
designed to align the incentives of individual state actors with the policy
objectives of liberty takings and suggest how to overcome the political
challenges to enactment.
One concern with this proposal is that the incentives created by
liberty takings may have too chilling an effect on the decisionmaking of
state actors and frustrate competing objectives of the criminal justice
system. For example, the state would face additional costs to prove
a valid concern is that we may live in a zero sum world at best when it comes to budgeting for the
criminal defense needs of the indigent. See Daryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense
Entitlements: An Argument From Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 801 (2004)
(arguing that the ìunderfunding of criminal indigent defense services is a long-term realityî).
306 In fact, only eight states and the District of Columbia uniformly provide counsel for the
indigent at bail hearings. Many states do not provide indigents with lawyers until after bail
hearings. See Douglas L. Colbert et. al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal
Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1723-24 (2002).
307 See infra Part II.C.2.
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guilt because defendants would have incentives to hold out for greater
evidence of the strength of the stateís case before copping a plea, and a
higher percentage of cases may go to trial. Prosecutors have limited
time and resources to enforce the law and face procedural hurdles in
prosecuting defendants.308 Prosecutors may have to deal with more
cases than their resources allow them to resolve in more than cursory
fashion. Devoting greater resources to screening and developing cases
may come at the expense of prosecuting marginal cases of questionable
guilt and allow guilty parties to go unpunished.
The threat of liberty takings claims may lead to non-prosecution or
reduced sentences in some marginal cases, but this proposal would have
little to no impact on the incentives of prosecutors and defendants in
cases in which the government has substantial evidence of guilt.
Liberty takings may heighten incentives to develop evidence of guilt,
but even this effect would be mild if the writing is on the wall. There
would be risks of jury nullification, sloppy or corrupt prosecution, or
exquisite defense work that could end up thwarting convictions in these
types of cases. But these risks already exist under the current system,
and it is unlikely that coupling these dangers with the risk of
compensation for pretrial detention would change incentives or
outcomes. Therefore, the potential for liberty takings claims would not
factor into bail hearing and plea bargaining processes in cases of
substantial evidence of guilt.
The impact of liberty takings would be seen in cases in which the
government has enough evidence to satisfy probable cause, yet faces
uncertainty as to whether it can satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard at trial. The more dubious the governmentís ability to prevail
at trial, the more the possibility of a liberty takings claim may factor
into decisions of both prosecutors and defendants. These are precisely
the types of cases in which we would want prosecutors to invest more
resources in developing the cases and to be reluctant to push for pretrial
detention. Similarly, strengthening the hands of defendants to hold out
for trial or a more favorable plea bargain may advance the cause of
justice. Admittedly, this effect may lead to tradeoffs of non-prosecution
or acquiescence to pleas highly favoring defendants in close cases, but
that may be the price of heightening accuracy in charging and
convictions.
The incentives created by liberty takings may also reduce the rate
of conviction among those individuals who would otherwise have failed
to meet bail, yet would now end up avoiding pretrial detention. This
outcome may partly reflect the many advantages that free men and
308 Procedural protections for defendants are extensive in theory, but limited in practice as they
generally only apply to trials. These protections matter little to most defendants whose cases are
resolved in the shadow of plea bargaining and the largely unbridled prosecutorial power that
drives this process. See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2491-93.
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women enjoy in conducting their defense and advance the intended goal
of lowering the number of convictions of innocent people.309 However,
it may also reflect the reduced willingness and ability of prosecutors to
pursue close cases because of the higher costs of prosecuting individuals
released on bail (due in large part to the higher probability of going to
trial). Additionally, a percentage of cases that prosecutors would have
resolved by plea-bargains under the existing system may now go to trial
and lead to erroneous acquittals. This tradeoff of some guilty parties
going unpunished or receiving lesser penalties may be necessary for the
sake of creating incentives for greater prosecutorial screening to reduce
the number of innocent people who are subjected to pretrial detention
and/or wrongfully convicted as a result.
A reduced reliance on pretrial detention may also increase crime on
the margins. Individuals released on bail may commit further crimes,
and others who are not prosecuted or convicted because of the
incentives liberty takings creates may go on to commit future crimes.310
But this concern should not be overstated. There is good reason to
believe that liberty takings may actually heighten deterrence by
providing incentives for enhanced screening of cases. Prosecutors may
then end up focusing more enforcement on truly guilty parties and
mitigate perceptions of arbitrary punishment by reducing the number of
erroneous pretrial detentions and wrongful convictions.311
Another understandable concern would be the degree to which
liberty takings would impair prosecutorsí ability to resolve cases
through plea bargaining.312 Both prosecutors and defendants would
know that the longer the defendant held out without copping a plea, the
309
310

See supra Part I.B.2.
See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 21-22 (noting that approximately thirty-two
percent of felony defendants released on bail engage in some form of misconduct while released).
Additionally, one can easily surmise that even innocent parties who are subjected to pretrial
detention under the current system generally must have some risk factors that supported the arrest
and bail hearing decisions. Therefore, in a statistical sense this pool of individuals may be more
likely to commit crimes than the general population, and the failure to detain or convict these
individuals may end up increasing crime rates.
311 The threat of liberty takings claims may also slow down the arrest process in close cases.
Prosecutors would have incentives to develop cases more thoroughly and to screen out weak
cases before proceeding to arrest and prosecute. Alternatively, legislatures or local governments
may even order state actors to initiate prosecutions and/or employ pretrial detention only if they
have strong enough evidence to avoid the risk of a liberty takings claim. Slowing down the arrest
process may lead to some individuals committing further crimes or escaping justice, but the
benefits of greater screening in close cases arguably outweighs these risks.
312 This concern should not be overstated. While the enactment of liberty takings might
produce a greater reliance on trials, this tradeoff is neither inevitable, nor is it necessarily
undesirable. See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 542, 626-42 (1990) (arguing that the French experience in relying less on plea bargaining
than the United States has not resulted in an appreciably greater number of trials); Wright &
Miller, supra note 20, at 42-50 (showing how a reduced reliance on plea bargaining may not
result in a significantly increased reliance on trials).
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greater potential liability the state might risk assuming. In a world
without liberty takings defendants often can only lose by holding out as
the benefits of a possibility of having oneís name cleared may be far
less than the economic and non-economic costs of pretrial detention. In
a world of liberty takings the defendant would have at least one trump
card to hold onto in order to secure a more favorable plea or to persuade
prosecutors to drop charges earlier if they face the potential cost of
liberty takings. The criminal justice systemís focus on plea bargains is
unlikely to change, but the threat of liberty takings may expedite the
process and enhance the terms for defendants.
While the potential for liberty takings may give pretrial detainees
some leverage, prosecutors have their own trump cards. Prosecutors
may seek to sidestep the force of a liberty taking by extracting waivers
of compensation from detainees as an official or unofficial condition of
their release. Similarly, cost-conscious municipalities might simply
respond to the threat of liberty takings by formally or informally
instructing prosecutors to make a waiver of compensation eligibility a
virtual condition of plea agreements with pretrial detainees.
Incorporating waiver provisions in plea agreements would almost
explicitly make liberty takings claims a bargaining chip in plea
bargaining negotiations.313 There is a danger that the ability to waive
liberty takings claims may undermine some of the incentive effects of
liberty takings by allowing prosecutors to exploit their many forms of
leverage over detainees.314 However, this bargaining chip could provide
detainees with significant leverage for securing a release from detention
without having to cop a false plea or for obtaining more favorable plea
agreement terms.

313 This approach has appeal because of the clear parallel with the real property context. A
landowner could consent to the indefinite occupation of his land by the government without
compensation, such as to fight a pestilence or another state purpose that may have nothing to do
with the landowner herself. Similarly, one could argue that an individual could consent to his
pretrial detention without compensation either before or after the fact as part of a settlement with
the state.
314 On the surface, it might appear appealing to make liberty takings claims non-waivable to
protect defendants from prosecutorial coercion and to keep the possibility of liability salient in the
mind of prosecutors during plea bargaining negotiations. Nonetheless, it may be quite difficult, if
not impossible, to make liberty takings claims truly non-waivable. Even if liberty takings claims
were non-waivable, one can easily imagine tacit bargains taking place between prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and defendants that release is conditioned upon a commitment not to raise a
liberty takings claim. Defense attorneys are often repeat players with prosecutors, and they
would face significant pressure to live up to their end of the bargain in thwarting such claims or
face retaliation from prosecutors in future cases. Former defendants also face an array of
potential threats from prosecutors that range from close policing of their post-release activities, to
threats of future prosecutions, or, worse still, threats of prosecutions of friends and loved ones.
Over time the gap between the letter of the law of non-waivability and circumvention in practice
would likely become so wide to the point of making a non-waivability provision all but
meaningless.
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3.

The Paradoxical Impact of Liberty Takings on Detainees

One paradox of this proposal is that individuals free on bail, who
would otherwise have been detained under the existing system, would
greatly benefit, while those who continue to be subjected to pretrial
detention may actually be worse off. Individuals free on bail or subject
to conditional release would be the greatest beneficiaries of liberty
takings, because they would be in much stronger bargaining positions
with prosecutors and face a lower probability of conviction and the
prospect of shorter sentences.315 In contrast, pretrial detainees would
only gain more limited leverage against prosecutors because of the
possibility of a liberty takings claim.316
Additionally, pretrial detainees may actually face greater formal
criminal punishment than they face under the current system. An
increase in criminal punishment might seem a perverse result at first
glance, yet it may represent progress in pressuring the state not to use
pretrial detention as a form of informal criminal risk management.
Detention is arguably a form of punishment in all but name, and the
federal government and many states tacitly recognize this fact by setting
off time served against detention against criminal sentences.317 Under
the current system many individuals are released without a conviction,
and the time served functions as a rough, informal punishment. Liberty
takings would provide state actors with incentives to formalize this
punishment by attempting to secure a conviction commensurate with the
initial decision to detain. Even convictions with sentences of time
served would serve as recognition that punishment took place for crimes
committed and help to legitimize the pretrial detention decisions.318
Another potential implication of liberty takings is that incentives to
dedicate more resources to prosecutorial screening and greater
development of cases may reveal greater culpability and lead to more
convictions and longer sentences.319 However, there is no reason to
315
316

See supra Part I.B.2.
For example, the state would have incentives to process these cases more quickly to reduce
prospective liberty takings liability. This incentive may not necessarily lead to more just
outcomes, but it may lead to more favorable plea bargains for defendants. Nonetheless, pretrial
detainees would still incur the many disadvantages of pretrial detention. See supra Part I.B.2.
317 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b).
318 Admittedly, convictions may constitute more than a mere formality for pretrial detainees.
Defendants who are convicted will have the conviction added to their criminal history, which may
heighten the length of sentences for future convictions under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.
In contrast, pretrial detainees who only face informal punishment and are eventually released may
have no mark on their record. Nonetheless, shifting to a liberty takings regime would have the
primary impact of formally recognizing that the use of pretrial detention constitutes a form of
criminal punishment.
319 If liberty takings succeed in creating incentives for greater prosecutorial screening, then
those individuals subjected to pretrial detention would be more likely to be guilty and to be guilty

67

L I BERT Y T AK I N G S
believe that in most cases the net time served in detention and
imprisonment would differ for detainees than under the existing
system.320 For these reasons, seemingly perverse outcomes for some
pretrial detainees appear consistent with the effects of greater
prosecutorial screening.

4.

Safeguards to Ensure State Actorsí Incentives Align with the
Policy Objectives

Much of this discussion has focused on the danger that liberty
takings may have too chilling an effect on decisionmaking or lead to
perverse results. However, it is important to consider the possibility
that liberty takings may be less effective than intended in shaping the
incentives of individual state actors. For this reason this proposal
includes additional safeguards to attempt to ensure that the incentives of
state actors align with the policy objectives of liberty takings.
When individuals or even corporations face costs, it is reasonable
to believe that the costs will directly shape their behavior.321 In
contrast, the effects of financial liability on government actions, and in
particular on the incentives of individual state actors, are admittedly
more uncertain.322 Prosecutors and judges both benefit from defendants
being subjected to pretrial detention because it expedites plea
bargaining and therefore reduces the trial load that they face.323 The
government as a whole benefits from the efficient administration of
criminal cases even if it comes at the cost of justice by disadvantaging
defendants and encouraging false pleas to secure release or minimize
the period of detention.

of more significant crimes than defendants currently subject to pretrial detention. Facing reduced
concerns that they are punishing the innocent, prosecutors may impose stiffer conditions for plea
bargains.
320 A related danger for pretrial detainees is that a state legislature might enact liberty takings,
but take with the left hand what it gives with the right by continuing to expand the number of
overlapping crimes. This result could hollow out the significance of liberty takings by making it
easier for prosecutors to secure convictions. This threat is particularly significant in the case of a
narrow conception of liberty takings as a single conviction would vindicate the detention
decision, and recourse to additional overlapping crimes would simply increase the incentives for
prosecutors to pile on charges to make pretrial detention and a plea more likely. However, the
broader conception of liberty takings avoids much of this danger by making eligibility for liberty
takings turn on whether the charge(s) underpinning the ultimate conviction could have reasonably
justified the pretrial detention decision. Certainly, if a legislature were intent on engaging in
eviscerating the substance of liberty takings, it could do so, but the broad conception of liberty
takings mitigates this particular risk.
321 See RICHARD A. P OSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (1992).
322 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 350.
323 See supra Part I.A.4.
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While the benefits to state actors of relying extensively on pretrial
detention are clear, there is admittedly some uncertainty as to the degree
of responsiveness of the state as a whole and individual actors to the
prospect of liberty takings compensation. The legislature would feel the
financial effects directly as added costs to the budgets, but the judges
and prosecutors who combine to make bail decisions would only
indirectly feel the impact from this new demand on public monies. For
this reason liberty takings should be designed to ensure that state actors
must take into account the costs of liberty takings.
The fact that a cause of action for liberty takings would be a
product of political action rather than the creation of the courts is
significant. Financial costs are only one part of the calculations of
government actors, and the combination of government liability with
political pressure may be essential to reduce the reliance on pretrial
detention.324 If a legislature enacted liberty takings, its passage should
be linked to parallel efforts to place greater pressure on judges and
prosecutors to minimize monies expended on compensation for liberty
takings. One way to do that would be to attempt to raise reputational
costs for prosecutors and judges by highlighting the degree to which
they detain innocent individuals.325
State legislatures or even
independent watchdog groups could easily track this data and publicize
the number of liberty takings cases and their resulting costs to pressure
judges and prosecutors who have repeatedly ìfailedî in detaining
individuals whose actual offenses did not merit such treatment.326
If shaming were deemed too weak or unpredictable a tool,327
another alternative would be to link liberty takings compensation to
prosecutorsí budgets or to prosecutorsí individual compensation by
reducing their salary or bonus in proportion to the number of successful
liberty takings claims. Linking liberty takings compensation to
prosecutorsí budgets may not be politically viable because a community
may not want to give the impression that the ability of prosecutors to
prosecute crime could be imperiled by compensation for pretrial
detention. But linking prosecutorsí bonuses or promotions to liberty
takings compensation may provide prosecutors with a direct incentive to
seek alternatives that fall short of pretrial detention.

324
325

See Levinson, supra note 25, at 353-54.
See Bibas, supra note 148, at 1042 (making a related argument that ìgreater transparency
and publicity of large charge reductions could deter overchargingî).
326 While individual monetary incentives can spur responsiveness, lawyersí competitiveness
concerning their political and professional reputations may be as or more important an impetus in
shaping their decisions. See Thomas Church & Milton Heumann, The Underexamined
Assumptions of the Invisible Hand: Monetary Incentives as Policy Instruments, 8 J. POLíY
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 641, 653-54 (1989).
327 See James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong With Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J.
1055, 1088 (1998).
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The hope would be that judges and prosecutors would respond to a
combination of state liability and increased political pressure from state
legislatures by reducing their reliance on pretrial detention. Faced with
a choice of funding liberty takings compensation or expending more
resources for alternatives to pretrial detention, state legislatures may
also equip judges and prosecutors with funding to expand dramatically
the scope of alternatives such as home detention or electronic
monitoring.328
Historically, the cost of funding less restrictive
alternatives to pretrial detention has been a stumbling block to this
reform.329 However, home confinement has become a far more costeffective option than detention. It costs the federal government on
average $64 per day to detain a defendant, while the average cost of
electronic monitoring and home confinement is approximately $18 per
day.330 Cost savings alone may not be sufficient to spur greater reliance
on home confinement over pretrial detention, but the existence of liberty
takings may make the cost calculus of governments tilt towards greater
reliance on these alternative restraints.
5.

A Safe Harbor to Heighten Incentives for Prosecutorial Screening

Having discussed many of the costs and potential incentive effects,
it is important to underscore one of the proposalís most important
objectives: heightening incentives for greater prosecutorial screening.
Liberty takings would give states incentives to invest in greater
prosecutorial screening and efforts to tailor criminal charges more
closely to expected trial or plea bargaining outcomes. These changes
would impose costs, but may also pay significant dividends in the long
run by screening out cases of arrests and detentions of individuals
whose ultimate convictions (or lack thereof) would not have justified
pretrial detention.
To this end, one extension of this proposal could be to temper the
force of liberty takings with a safe harbor provision that is designed to
heighten procedural protections for defendants.331 For example, a safe
328 Electronic monitoring and home confinement are currently only used sparingly. As of
1995, thirty states either confined or monitored 30,000 individuals. See Margaret P. Spencer,
Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 374 (1995).
329 See Betsy Kushlan Wanger, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional Release:
The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320, 321-22 (1987)
(discussing how administrative costs have served as a stumbling block to the conditional release
of defendants).
330 See Darren Gowen, Overview of the Federal Home Confinement Program 1988-1996, 64
FED. PROBATION 11, 11 (2000) (noting that in 1997 it cost the federal government on average
$64.32 per day to detain a defendant, yet only cost $17.98 to monitor home confinement).
331 Reforms implemented in the New Orleans prosecutorís office demonstrate how an agenda
of enhancing prosecutorial screening is realistic and may have concrete results in improving the
quality of the criminal justice system. See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 51-58.
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harbor for a state liberty takings statute could allow localities to avoid
liability for liberty takings if they systematically implement a higher
standard for bail hearings. Most jurisdictions employ a standard of
ìclear and convincingî evidence to determine whether bail should be
denied because the defendant poses a flight risk or threat to public
safety.332 A safe harbor provision could mandate that the standard
comes significantly closer to the trial standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt.333 This approach may lead to enhanced prosecutorial screening
of cases and significantly reduce the error rate for both pretrial
detentions and convictions.
Additionally, a safe harbor provision could mandate shifting the
balancing test for bail setting to favor defendants more or to weigh more
heavily particular factors, such as the defendantís actual ability to meet
bail. Few could contest the benefits of greater prosecutorial screening,
if only to reduce social and government waste from wrongful
prosecutions and detentions. Weighing factors in bail setting to favor
defendants might be more controversial. But this approach could be
designed to focus on the defendantís financial circumstances, a factor
that should drive most monetary-based bail calculations yet is generally
not even considered.334
Even the most thorough screening system would still leave a subset
of defendants who are subjected to pretrial detention yet never
convicted of any crime. In an ideal world, these individuals could still
receive compensation, and liberty takings could be bundled together
with other reforms. But as a second best solution, the safe harbor
approach is appealing because it could offer localities a viable
alternative to provide greater procedural protections for defendants.
6.

The Political Challenge

The question of political viability is a difficult one, as creating a
cause of action to enhance the rights of defendants would face
significant political stumbling blocks. The political culture on
defendantsí rights has shifted in a significantly more conservative
direction over the past generation.335 Politicians win points by closing
332
333

See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1979).
Completely conflating the bail hearing and trial standard would be too strict, especially
given the significant societal interests at stake in detaining defendants who may pose an ongoing
threat to society. But elevating the standard of proof to some level between clear and convincing
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt may substantially decrease the number of innocent
defendants who are subject to pretrial detention.
334 Some states already require judges to consider the actual ability of defendants to meet bail.
See, e.g., TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 17.15 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2000).
335 See Darryl K. Brown, The Jurisprudential Legacy of the Warren Court: Reform of
Criminal Procedure in the States: The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and
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alleged loopholes in the criminal law and showing they are tough on
crime by narrowing opportunities for parole.336 Since politicians
disproportionately come from the ranks of former prosecutors, one can
imagine they may have the least qualms about a system of rough justice
through the use of pretrial detentions.337
The group most affected by our systemís extensive reliance on
pretrial detention is low-income people of all races whose crime may be
simply being too poor to meet bail, and therefore this group is also
likely to lack the means to mount an effective defense.338 This
politically powerless group lacks both the fundraising power and the
organizational clout of other discrete groups that may be more able to
capture the attention of politicians and the public. It is precisely this
type of situation that has motivated others in the past to appeal to the
conscience of judges to discover new sources of jurisdiction and new
interpretations of rights to secure the civil liberties of the vulnerable.339
But regardless of the wisdom of this path, the judicial culture of today is
far more cautious that that of the Warren era in finding new ways to
safeguard civil liberties.340
The label of ìliberty takingsî might appear to be a call for judges
to reinterpret the Takings Clause.341 However, framing this cause of
action as a personal taking is designed to cast the issue of pretrial
detention in terms that may resonate with the public. The Takings
Clause symbolizes our nationís commitment that society should not
force an individual to bear a burden for the sake of society as a whole.342
The analogy between the taking of property and the taking of people
speaks for itself as it underscores the hypocrisy of a society that
provides greater protection for the deprivation of property than for the
seizure of people. Framing pretrial detention as a form of taking is
Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1423-26 (2002) (discussing how
pressures from both the left and the right of the political spectrum pushed the American criminal
justice system along a more punitive path over the past generation).
336 See Williams, supra note 6, at 326 (noting that ì[p]retrial detention is politically popular
because it symbolizes a government tough on crimeî); see also Tribe, supra note 97, at 373-74
(making a similar point).
337 See Medwed, supra note 103, at 153.
338 See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 2, at 339-40.
339 See Robert Jerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61
TENN. L. REV. 869, 884-919 (1994) (discussing how the Supreme Court transformed the
relationship of federal and state courts through its civil rights decisions in the 1950s and 1960s).
340 See Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional
Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 64 (1999).
341 It is a time-honored American litigation tactic to cloak any number of alleged wrongs under
the rubric of another recognized legal right. In this case, the clear text of the Fifth Amendment
precludes such an interpretation, and liberty takings is designed as a legislative proposal, which is
based on the appeal of the analogy to the taking of property.
342 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (noting the Takings Clause is
ìdesigned to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a wholeî).
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designed to appeal simultaneously to the publicís sense of fairness and
to build off of an awareness of the governmentís obligation to
compensate whenever it takes private property.
The challenge in problem construction is often in identifying and
highlighting a causË celebrË which can open popular eyes to a particular
injustice.343 Wen Ho Leeís high-profile prosecution and nine-month
detention and the governmentís scandalous exaggeration of its case to
secure his pretrial detention may serve as a compelling ìposter childî
case.344 While the government secured a token plea, the backlash of
popular opinion to the governmentís treatment of Lee suggested that the
public felt this use of pretrial detention was an abuse of state power.345
One powerful symbol may be enough to spur a movement or at least to
prick the popular conscience. On the other hand, the controversy
surrounding enemy combatant detainees has captured public attention,
and the war on terror may continue to divert attention from the much
larger and equally significant issue of the costs inflicted on detainees by
the routine use of pretrial detention.
Nonetheless, the fact that the governmentís detention powers have
risen to the forefront of public debate may ultimately be fruitful in
facilitating a discussion of liberty takings. Creating a potential new
drain on public resources may not be popular in a time of growing
budget deficits. But casting the idea as one of providing incentives for
recourse to less restrictive means than pretrial detention to secure a
defendantís presence at trial may enhance its appeal.346 This framing
may help the concept gain traction as a potential way of ultimately
saving money that may now be wasted on housing and, at times,
ensuring the wrongful conviction of pretrial detainees. It would be
unrealistic to hope that the federal government would enact liberty
takings at any time in the foreseeable future. However, it is possible
that individual states which have had historic commitments to the public
defense of indigents might have a political climate which would make it
favorable towards their serving as a laboratory of democracy in
experimenting with compensation for pretrial detainees.347 The political

343 See Jeffrey Manns, Note, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509, 2528-29 (2003)
(discussing the significance of problem construction for mobilizing popular support).
344 See id.
345 See David Johnston & Don Van Natta Jr., Wary of Risk, Slow to Adapt, F.B.I. Stumbles in
Terror War, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002, ß 1, at 1.
346 The American public in recent years appears to have had a virtually boundless acceptance
of high levels of incarceration that are amongst the highest in the world. However, the fact that
incarceration rates have been dramatically lower for most of American history suggests that the
American public may accept tools that reduce reliance on pretrial detention. See Brown, supra
note 37, at 365-66.
347 See Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideonís Promise: Lessons from England and the Need
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 908-09 (2004) (discussing the depth of Massachusettsí
commitment to enhancing public defender support for the defense of indigents).
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road may be admittedly steep, but the beauty of federalism is that a
single state can be a trailblazer in enacting the idea.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Almost all observers agree that the deck is stacked in favor of
prosecutors at almost every step of the criminal justice process.
Defenders of the current system will emphasize that the deck is stacked
for a reason and that the resulting leverage of prosecutors over
defendants serves the interests of justice. An implicit instrumentalism
has justified sacrificing the liberty of detainees for the sake of
facilitating expeditious plea bargaining and a rough system of justice.
While defendants have recourse to some checks on the state,348 in the
end defenders of the current system simply posit that we must trust
government decisionmakers to exercise their discretionary powers
responsibly and accept pretrial detention as a form of rough justice.
This proposalís conception of liberty takings offers a way to help
to level a highly uneven playing field for criminal defendants in bail
hearing and plea bargaining processes.349 The idea of compensating
individuals for infringements of liberty could be extended into other
spheres,350 but this Article has consciously cabined liberty takings to the
context of pretrial detention in the hope of making the proposal
politically plausible. Otherwise, the specter of opening up a Pandoraís
Box of financial liabilities for encroachments on liberty may take the air
out of this initiative for tempering the power of prosecutors and
compensating pretrial detainees.
This proposal is not a panacea, but rather represents progress in
leveling the playing field in bail hearings and plea bargaining that may
be complemented by other efforts to temper prosecutorial discretion and
to expand prosecutorial screening. Liberty takings admittedly faces an
uphill political climb. But this Article has shown how the analogy with
the taking of property provides the basis for a principled framework for
348 In a world of plea bargaining, most legal checks may be moot, as those who lack the means
to meet bail are also those most likely to be unable to have adequate legal counsel to exercise the
advantages that the criminal justice system affords them.
349 See Brown, supra note 37, at 330-31 (arguing that under the current system ìthere is little
effective pressure from the defense side to moderate government policy on criminal justiceî).
350 It is easy to see how this idea could extend to other areas, such as to the detention of
material witnesses prior to trial, see Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 583 (1973)
(sidestepping the issue of whether a takings claim could be made in the case of individuals
detained as material witnesses), or to the detention of alleged illegal immigrants prior to civil
deportation proceedings. See Legomsky, supra note 6, at 533. Others have sought to expand the
reach of liability rules to encompass these and many other state encroachments. See, e.g.,
EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 95 (arguing that ì[a]ll regulations, all taxes, and all modifications of
liability rules are takings of private property prima facie compensable by the stateî).
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compensating pretrial detainees and for providing incentives for the
state to rely less on pretrial detention as a tool of rough justice.
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